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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Essays in Household Finance 
by Fernando Lopez 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2014 
 
Professor Radhakrishnan Gopalan, Chair 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the determinants of 
individual financial decision making and the welfare implications of those decisions. 
In the first essay, I consider an important dimension of individual welfare, namely 
mental health, to study whether the use of different financial services helped to 
withstand the damage caused by a large earthquake that hit Chile in February 
2010. Using a rich nationally representative panel data set and geographic 
differences in ground shaking caused by the earthquake as an exogenous source of 
damage, I find that earthquake insurance reduced the incidence of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) by more than 50% among individuals who lived in properties 
that were damaged by the earthquake. However, I find no significant effects for the 
amount of savings and bank relationships. Overall, these results suggest that the 
welfare impact of financial services is driven by the ability to transfer resources 
across states of the world, but not through time. 
In the second essay, I study the extent to which low income students in the 
U.S. understand and take into consideration the financial aspects of their higher 
education. Using a rich data set from a large U.S. non-profit organization, I find 
that low income post-secondary students are poorly informed about three main 
financial aspects of their higher education: expected income, financing costs and 
vii 
 
opportunity cost of being enrolled. This result holds for students who are 
academically talented, have been exposed to financial education (including a 
semester-long personal finance class) and relevant financial experiences. 
Furthermore, preliminary results of a randomized controlled trial (N=117) suggest 
that an hour-long financial education workshop on the main financial aspects of 
college increases students’ GPA by 0.2 points (p-value=0.15) and their ability to 
receive financial aid from the non-profit organization by 11.4 percentage points (p-
value=0.25). Overall, these results suggest that (lack of) financial literacy can affect 
both educational attainment and financial outcomes of low income post-secondary 
students. 
In the third essay, I study if civic capital, defined as the set of values and 
beliefs within a community that promote cooperation for socially valuable purposes 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011), affects the use of deposit accounts among 
Chilean households. Using an institutional setting of limited supply side barriers 
for access to deposit accounts and a rich household data set, I find that households 
from areas with higher levels of civic capital, measured as the rate of registration to 
vote, are more likely to have savings accounts and hold larger amounts in those 
accounts. This association is stronger for households that are less educated and less 
intensive users of communication and information devices such as phone, computer 
and the internet. These results are consistent with the idea that civic capital helps 
to overcome educational and informational barriers that limit the demand for 
deposit accounts. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Financial Services and Individual Welfare* 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
How do consumption smoothing mechanisms affect individual welfare? 
Financial markets provide several mechanisms that help consumers mitigate the 
costs of adverse economic shocks. Yet, supply and demand side frictions can prevent 
the optimal use of these mechanisms1. In this context, understanding the individual 
welfare effects of consumption smoothing vehicles can be instructive for policies to 
promote use of insurance in particular (e.g. Chetty and Finkelstein, 2012) and other 
financial services in general. Addressing this problem is difficult because measures 
of individual welfare are not easy to come by in data sets that contain information 
on individual use of financial services. One traditional approach to overcome this 
challenge is to study the effect of insurance and other financial services on financial 
decisions such as consumption (e.g. Townsend, 1994; Morduch, 1995; Gruber, 1997) 
or the ability to pay bills (e.g. Morse, 2011; Melzer, 2011). However, these studies 
have the limitation that individuals can react to economic shocks by adjusting 
different types of expenditures (e.g. consumption, loan repayments, investments in 
human capital and health care) and thus the welfare implications associated with 
                                                          
* I am very grateful to my dissertation committee: Radha Gopalan, Ohad Kadan, Anjan Thakor, 
Jialan Wang and Cynthia Cryder; participants of the finance brown bag seminar at Olin business 
school, Alexei Ovtchinnikov (FMA Discussant) and Yelena Larkin for valuable comments and 
suggestions. I also thank Jose Zubizarreta for providing the data on peak ground acceleration of 
Chilean municipalities during the earthquake that hit the Chilean territory on February 27th, 2010.  
1 For instance, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that competitive markets under asymmetric 
information can produce underinsurance or even the breakdown of insurance markets. Similarly, 
some demand side frictions documented in the literature are: trust (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 
2004 and 2008; Cole, Giné, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend and Vickery, 2013), financial literacy 
(Cole and Zia, 2011; Alessie, Lusardi and Van Rooj, 2011, Gaurav, Cole and Tobacman, 2011) and 
liquidity constraints (e.g. Cole, Giné, Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend and Vickery, 2013; Rampini 
and Viswanathan, 2013). 
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specific financial decisions are not straightforward2. In addition, existing evidence is 
mixed and inconclusive. 
In this paper, I consider one important determinant of individual welfare, 
namely mental health, to empirically study whether the use of financial services 
(insurance and savings) helps to withstand the damages caused by a natural 
disaster. The use of mental health to understand the welfare implications of the use 
of financial services is novel and has three main attractive features. First, mental 
health is closely related to the concept of experienced utility, defined as the 
frequency and intensity of experiences of pleasure and pain (e.g. Kahneman and 
Krueger, 2006). Second, mental health conditions entail large costs for individuals 
and society. In the US, for instance, they were among the five most costly health 
conditions in 1996 and 2006 (Soni, 2011) and one out of four adults have at least one 
mental condition in a given year (Kessler et al, 2005). In addition, mental health 
conditions are associated with lower productivity (Stewart et al, 2003; Kessler et al, 
2006; Beck et al, 2011) and earnings (Kessler et al, 2008; Helliwell, Layard and 
Sachs, 2013). Third, there is mounting literature documenting that mental health is 
affected by economic shocks such as changes in pension plans (De Grip, 2012), 
income (Baird, de Hoop and Özler, 2013), lottery prizes (Gardner and Oswald, 
2007), stock market returns (Schwandt, 2012) and unemployment (Ruhm, 2000). 
Hence, to the extent that economic shocks affect mental health, financial services 
can mitigate the effects of these shocks by enabling individuals to allocate resources 
across states of the world and through time. 
The empirical setting relies on two main ingredients. First, I exploit the 
damages caused by a large earthquake that hit Chile on February 27th 2010. This 
earthquake had a magnitude of 8.8 in the Mercalli scale, affected nearly 80% of the 
country’s population and it is the sixth largest registered in the world between 1900 
and 2012. Second, I use a rich nationally representative panel of Chilean 
individuals that contains survey information about four months before and four 
                                                          
2 See Chetty and Looney (2006) for a formal discussion on the limitations of consumption as a 
measure of welfare. 
3 
 
months after the earthquake. This data set has three main attractive features. 
First, the ex-post survey includes a module with questions that allow one to 
measure the presence of symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which 
is one of the most frequent and debilitating mental health conditions that can 
develop after a potentially traumatic event (Galea et al, 2005). Second, the survey 
has information about use of different financial services such as insurance, deposit 
accounts and the amounts held in those accounts before the earthquake, which 
allows me to compare the relative merits of different financial services under 
similar experimental conditions. Third, the survey has rich information on ex-ante 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, physical and mental health 
conditions, quality of health insurance, strength of social networks and ex-post 
relief efforts by the government and private agents. This information allows me to 
address a number of potential sources of endogeneity associated with the use of 
financial services. 
I find that earthquake insurance reduces the incidence of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) by more than 50% among individuals who lived in properties 
that were damaged by the earthquake. Since mental health conditions entail large 
costs for individuals and society, this result highlights an important benefit of 
property insurance. In addition, I find no significant effects associated with the use 
of bank accounts and the amounts held in those accounts. These results hold even 
for individuals from properties that experienced minor damages and had savings 
equivalent to more than three months of rent. Taken together, these results suggest 
a minor role of relationship banking and precautionary saving mechanisms for the 
mental burden caused by a natural disaster. In other words, the mental burden is 
driven by the ability to transfer resources across states of the world, but not 
through time. 
There are two sets of potentially confounding factors that I address with my 
empirical strategy. First, the extent of damage to a dwelling, is likely to be a 
function of the strength of construction and consequently the wealth of the 
individual. Individual’s wealth can also be correlated with their susceptibility to 
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PTSD. I address this concern by comparing the incidence of PTSD among 
individuals from areas that experienced high and low ground shaking. The use of 
geography as an instrument relies on two assumptions. First, the extent of house 
damage depends on the ground shaking caused by the earthquake. The second 
assumption is that households in areas with more and less ground shaking are 
similar. This exclusion restriction is based on the fact that the Chilean territory is 
highly seismic3 and, to date, it is not possible to determine the exact time and 
location where an earthquake will hit (e.g., Allen and Kanamory, 2003; Geller, 
2011). Hence, the probability that the ground shakes in a specific geographic area is 
unknown ex ante and thus unlikely to be related to individual characteristics that 
may affect their susceptibility to PTSD. Although the exclusion restriction is not 
testable, I verify that the magnitude of the correlation between PTSD and the 
measure of ground shaking is statistically the same in a model that incorporates a 
wide range of municipality-level characteristics and other without any controls. 
The second set of confounding factors for my identification is systematic 
differences between individuals with and without financial services that can make 
them more or less susceptible to PTSD after experiencing a shock. The empirical 
setting does not include a source of exogenous variation for the use of financial 
services. However, I find that my results are robust to the several potential sources 
of endogeneity related to the use of financial services. 
I start by considering socioeconomic factors that can affect both the use of 
financial services and the ability to cope with economic shocks. These include 
income, education, an estimated price of rent of the main property and having a 
second property. I find that the main results are not driven by pre-existing 
differences along these socioeconomic characteristics. The next set of omitted 
variables that could bias my estimates are the allocation of relief efforts across more 
versus less damaged areas. It could be the case that people with insurance may also 
                                                          
3 The Chilean territory is located in the “Ring of Fire”, an area that accounts for nearly 90% of 
seismic activity in the World. Figure 1.1 shows all the earthquakes that have hit the Chilean 
territory with intensity 6.5 or greater in the Mercalli scale.   
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have greater ability to access and benefit from relief efforts. Controlling for whether 
or not the individual has received or expects to receive any public or private aid 
does not affect the results. Finally, the strength of social ties that an individual has 
can increase both their ability to cope with a natural disaster and their 
participation in financial markets (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004 and 2008). 
Controlling for the participation in community organizations before the earthquake 
as a proxy for strength of social ties does not change the main results.  
In a second set of tests, I explore the possibility that my results are driven by 
pre-existing mental and overall health conditions. It is well known that health and 
wealth are positively correlated (e.g Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St. Amour, 2012; Rosen 
and Wu, 2004). In addition, the psychological and psychiatric literature suggests 
that previous mental health disorders are a major driver of PTSD (e.g. Sledjeski et 
al, 2008). The survey conducted before the earthquake includes questions that ask 
individuals if they had suffered from any mental impairment, were treated for 
depression in the last 12 months and a self-assessment of their overall health 
condition. Controlling for these pre-existing conditions of mental and overall health 
does not affect the main results. Similarly, I examine the possibility that the 
associations between use of financial services and PTSD are driven by the quality of 
health insurance. In particular, risk averse individuals can be more likely to invest 
in insurance in general and thus be less likely to develop symptoms of PTSD 
because they have access to better health care. Empirical tests suggest that this is 
not the case. 
This paper contributes to a growing literature on household risk management 
(e.g. Shiller, 2008; Lusardi, Schneider and Tufano, 2011; Rampini and 
Viswanathan, 2013; Koijen, Van Nieuwerburgh and Yogo, 2013; Cole, Giné, 
Tobacman, Topalova, Townsend and Vickery, 2013) by documenting that mental 
health can be an important benefit of property insurance as opposed to savings and 
bank relationships. This study also contributes to the literature that studies how 
the use of financial services affects real outcomes such as foreclosures (Morse, 2011) 
and the ability to pay mortgage, rent and utility bills (Melzer, 2011). In addition, 
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this paper is related to studies that examine the effect of mood (e.g. Kuhnen and 
Knutson, 2011; Bassi, Colacito, and Fulghieri, 2013, Andrade, Odean and Lin, 2012) 
and mental health (Bogan and Fertig, 2013) on financial decision making. 
Specifically, the results of this paper suggest that financial decisions can affect 
emotions and thus raise the possibility of important feedback effects between 
financial decisions and mood. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the 
theoretical and empirical framework. In section 3, I discuss the data and descriptive 
statistics. In section 4, I describe the main results and robustness checks. I conclude 
in section 5.  
 
1.2. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Tests 
 
1.2.1. Theoretical Framework 
 
Psychological literature suggests that the mental burden associated with a 
potentially traumatic event depends on individuals’ subjective evaluation of harm 
and their perceived ability to cope with the event4. Hence, the pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages resulting from a natural disaster can contribute to individuals’ 
mental burden through damage or destruction of private property, personal 
injuries, injuries or death of family and friends, fear experienced during the disaster 
and damage to the infrastructure from the area that people typically use (e.g. 
schools, roads and workplace). In this context, financial services can have an effect 
on mental health to the extent they reduce either the effects of the economic shock 
or the mental burden resulting from the shock. 
I consider three mechanisms that could have helped individuals to cope with 
the wealth losses caused by the earthquake: insurance, savings and bank 
relationships. Earthquake insurance can mitigate the mental burden associated 
                                                          
4 For a review of this literature, see Cohen, Kessler and Gordon (1995) and references therein. 
7 
 
with wealth losses by providing a positive payoff in a bad state of the world. Savings 
allow to smooth consumption over time by allowing to immediately repair or replace 
physical assets that result damaged or destroyed by the earthquake (e.g. structure 
of dwellings and appliances). Similarly, bank relationships, defined in this paper as 
the use of bank accounts, can enable individuals to accelerate the repairing and 
replacement of damaged assets through increased access to credit (Boot, 2000).  
 
1.2.2. Empirical Model and Identification Strategy 
 
Consider the following empirical model of mental health: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐷𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝑆) + 𝛽2 ∙ ?̃?𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖) + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝑆) ∙ 𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖) + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐷𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝑆) ∙ ?̃?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (1) 
 
where:  
 𝑌𝑖: measure of mental burden. 
 𝐷𝑖: measure of damage caused by the earthquake. 
 𝐹𝑖: dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals with a specific 
financial service and zero otherwise. 
 ?̃?𝑖: vector of individual characteristics (socioeconomic and health). 
 𝑆: state variable that measures the intensity of ground shaking due to the 
earthquake. 
 𝜀𝑖: error term. 
 
This model assumes that mental health depends on a set of individual 
characteristics ?̃?𝑖, use of financial services 𝐹𝑖 and the extent of damage 𝐷𝑖. In 
addition to the intensity of ground shaking 𝑆, the extent of damage depends on 
individual characteristics because the extent of damage to physical assets (e.g. 
dwelling and appliances) is likely to be a function of the strength of construction 
and consequently the socioeconomic characteristics of the individual. Similarly, 
consistent with the literature on participation in financial markets (Campbell, 2006, 
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Rampini and Vishwanathan, 2013), I assume that the use of a specific financial 
service depends on a set of socioeconomic, demographic and health 
characteristics ?̃?𝑖. Interaction terms 𝐷𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝑆) ∙ 𝐹𝑖(?̃?𝑖) and 𝐷𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝑆) ∙ ?̃?𝑖 capture the role 
of financial services and other individual characteristics for the susceptibility of 
mental health among individuals that experienced an economic shock respectively.  
The parameter of interest, 𝛽, measures the extent to which a given financial 
service affects the mental burden associated with the damage caused by the 
earthquake. Empirically identifying this parameter requires that we observe the 
full set of individual characteristics (?̃?𝑖) and a correct specification of the model. 
Since my data does not have information on all possible factors that can affect 
mental health, the main identification challenge is an omitted variable problem. In 
addition, the direction of the bias is unclear because most potentially omitted 
factors affect the extent of economic damage and use of financial services in 
different directions. For example, individuals with better socioeconomic background 
are more likely to use financial services and less likely to have their dwellings 
damaged after a natural disaster because they live in stronger dwellings. 
I address the omitted variable problem by using geographic differences in 
ground shaking caused by the earthquake as a source of exogenous variation for the 
extent of home damage. The use of geography as an instrument relies on two 
assumptions. First, the extent of home damage to a dwelling depends on ground 
shaking caused by the earthquake. The second assumption is that households in 
areas with more and less ground shaking are similar. This exclusion restriction is 
based on the fact that the Chilean territory is highly seismic5 and, to date, it is not 
possible to determine the exact time and location where an earthquake will hit (e.g., 
Allen and Kanamory, 2003; Geller, 2011). Hence, the probability that the ground 
shakes in a specific geographic area is unknown ex ante and thus unlikely to be 
related individual characteristics that can affect susceptibility to PTSD. This fact is 
                                                          
5 The Chilean territory is located in the “Ring of Fire”, an area that accounts for nearly 90% of 
seismic activity in the World. Figure 1.1 shows all the earthquakes that have hit the Chilean 
territory with intensity 6.5 or greater in the Mercalli scale.   
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documented by Zubizarreta, Cerda and Rosenbaum (2013) and confirmed by the 
empirical results presented in section 3(c). 
In addition, I focus on verifying the robustness of my results after controlling 
for a rich set of factors that could eventually affect both use of financial services and 
susceptibility to PTSD. Specifically, I estimate the following empirical model: 
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 ∙ 𝐹𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐺𝑖 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       (2) 
 
where: 
𝐺𝑖: is a dummy that takes the value 1 for areas that experienced high ground 
shaking and zero otherwise. 
𝑋𝑖: is a vector of observable variables that could potentially affect both use of 
financial services and susceptibility to PTSD symptoms. 
 
1.3. Data 
 
I use a unique panel data set of 22,456 Chilean households that completed 
the national socioeconomic survey (CASEN) about 4 months before and 4 months 
after the earthquake. The CASEN survey is administered every 2-3 years since 
1985 and its goal is to assess the socioeconomic conditions of the Chilean population 
in order to improve the design, targeting, implementation and evaluation of social 
programs6. In this study, the ex-ante survey was conducted between November and 
December of 2009 to a nationally representative sample of 71,460 households. This 
survey contains detailed information about individual’s employment, income, 
health, education, housing, use of financial services and geographic location. 
Between May and June of 2010, a nationally representative subsample of 22,456 
households interviewed in 2009 was re-interviewed in order to assess changes in the 
socioeconomic conditions of the population due to the earthquake that hit Chile in 
                                                          
6 Source: http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/casen/en/descripcion_obj.html accessed on 
5/22/2013. 
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February 2010. This “ex-post” survey collects information on how the earthquake 
affected individuals’ employment, income, health, education, housing and the coping 
mechanisms used to overcome the effects of the earthquake. Overall, the sample 
used in this study is based on information about 26,079 individuals who responded 
to a mental health module (discussed below) available in the ex-post survey. The 
information had to be provided by the same individual who responded to the survey 
in 2009 or another member of the household 18+ years old. The data collection for 
both surveys was performed through face to face interviews. Descriptive statistics of 
all variables are in Table 1.1a. The specific wording of the survey questions is in 
appendix 2.  
 
1.3.1. Mental Health 
 
The mental health condition I consider in this paper is post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), the most frequent and debilitating mental health condition 
observed among individuals that experience a natural disaster or other potentially 
traumatic event (Galea, 2006)7. I study the presence of PTSD symptoms using the 
Davidson Trauma Scale (DTS; Davidson, 1997). This scale that has been validated 
for different demographic groups and several potentially traumatic events, 
including the Chilean population that experienced the earthquake studied in this 
paper (Leiva-Bianchi and Araneda, 2013). Specifically, the assessment (Appendix 1) 
is based on a survey that has 17 questions about the severity (0 “not distressing at 
all” to 4 “extremely distressing”) and frequency (0 “not at all” to 4 “for every day”) of 
different PTSD symptoms. The sum of scores for severity and frequency of each of 
                                                          
7 The assessment of PTSD is based on the presence of a potentially traumatic event and the mental 
burden triggered by this event. Specifically, according to the American Psychological Association 
(2013), the criteria to diagnose PTSD are: (i) direct or indirect experience of a traumatic event, (ii) 
frequent re-experiencing of the traumatic event, (iii) persistent effortful avoidance of the distressing 
trauma-related stimuli after the event, (iv) negative alterations in cognitions and mood that began or 
worsened after the traumatic event, (v) trauma-related alterations in arousal and reactivity that 
began or worsened after the traumatic event (vi) persistence of symptoms (ii)-(v) for more than one 
month, (vii) significant symptom-related distress or functional impairment and (viii) the disturbance 
is not due to medication, substance use, or other illness. PTSD symptoms can last for several years. 
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these symptoms results in a score (PTSD Index) that ranges from 0 to 136 points. 
Following the medical literature, the outcome variable I consider for the empirical 
tests is a dummy that takes the value 1 when “PTSD Index” is greater than or equal 
to 40 points and zero otherwise8. Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics for 
the measure of PTSD. The average score for “PTSD Index” is 15 points. 
Furthermore, based on the 40 point cutoff, 13% of the sample had symptoms of 
PTSD after the earthquake.  
 
1.3.2. Financial Services  
 
Data on earthquake insurance is a dummy that takes the value 1 for 
individuals who declare holding earthquake insurance before the earthquake. This 
variable is from the ex-post survey. At the time of the ex-post survey, nearly one 
third of insurance policies claimed were paid off (SVS, 2012). The measure of bank 
relationships, labeled as “Any Savings”, is a dummy that takes the value 1 for 
individuals who held any of the following products: savings accounts, voluntary 
retirement accounts, equity (stocks or mutual funds) or informal savings. The 
measure of savings, labeled as “Total Savings”, is defined as the amount saved or 
invested in these accounts. Measures of savings and bank relationships are 
obtained from the ex-ante survey. The next section only reports the results for “Any 
Savings” and “Total Savings” because the results for each of their individual 
components are qualitatively and quantitatively the same. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Although the 40-point cutoff is typically used to assess symptoms of PTSD (Davidson et. al., 1997), 
the results of this paper are not sensitive to this choice. Indeed, the main results remain for different 
cutoffs (30 and 50 points) and when the outcome variable is defined as the PTSD Index (raw and 
winsorized). 
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1.3.3. Instrument for the Damage Caused by the 
Earthquake 
 
I consider the geographic variation in “peak ground acceleration” (PGA), a 
measure of ground shaking caused by the earthquake (Zubizarreta, Cerdá and 
Rosenbaum, ZCR 2013)9, as a source of exogenous variation for the damage caused 
by the earthquake across different geographic areas. ZCR use estimated PGA 
values provided by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to compute PGAs at 
municipality level, the smallest geographic and administrative division of the 
Chilean territory. Since the values provided by the USGS are not reported at 
municipality level, ZCR compute municipality level PGA using weighted averages 
based on the location of the municipality and the PGA values provided by the 
USGS. Municipalities from areas were the earthquake was barely felt and the 
USGS did not provide a PGA value, ZCR impute a value equal to 0. Figure 1.2 plots 
the PGA values across the Chilean territory. 
The use of PGA as a source of exogenous variation in wealth losses relies on 
the assumption that areas that experienced high and low PGA do not have 
systematic differences in factors that can affect both the level of damage and PTSD 
symptoms. Table 1.2 presents linear probability estimates of the effect of PGA on 
PSTD in a specification with and without several municipality-level characteristics. 
Consistent with the assumptions of the exclusion restriction, I find that the 
magnitude of the effect of PGA on PTSD is statistically the same in the specification 
without controls (Column 1) versus the specifications that control for socioeconomic 
factors, health and a characterization of the physical quality of the dwelling at 
municipality level (Columns (2)-(4)).  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 I thank to Jose Zubizarreta for providing this data. 
13 
 
1.4. Results 
 
1.4.1. Main Results 
 
The main results can be summarized in the two-way tabulations of Table 1.3. 
This table presents the fraction of individuals with symptoms of PTSD across 
intensity of ground shaking and use of financial services. Individuals from high 
(low) PGA areas are those from municipalities with an estimated PGA above (below) 
the median. The first row shows that individuals from areas that experienced high 
PGA were 13.6 (=20.1-6.5) percentage points more likely to develop symptoms of 
PTSD compared to individuals from areas that experienced low PGA. Panel (a) 
presents the incidence of PTSD disaggregated by holding of earthquake insurance. 
Column (4) shows that earthquake insurance reduces the incidence of PTSD by 6 
percentage points in areas that experienced high PGA. This figure represents a 45% 
(=6%/13.3%) of the mean incidence of PTSD symptoms in the population and 30% 
(=6%/20.1%) of the incidence of PTSD symptoms in areas that experienced high 
PGA. This result is mostly driven by individuals from high PGA areas where 
earthquake insurance reduces the incidence of PTSD by 5.3 percentage points 
(Column (3)). In contrast, panel (b) of Table 1.3 presents the incidence of PTSD for 
individuals who had and did not have savings before the earthquake. The results 
show that having any savings is not correlated with the incidence of PTSD in more 
affected areas (Column (4)).  
The first concern with the results described above is the possibility that the 
geographic variation in PGA is correlated with characteristics that affect both the 
use of financial services and the incidence of PTSD. In order to address this concern, 
I estimate a linear probability model where the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes the value 1 for individuals with a score of 40 or larger according to the 
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Davidson Trauma Scale and zero otherwise10. The coefficients associated with the 
interaction term between “PGA High”, a dummy that takes the value 1 for 
individuals from areas that experienced a PGA above the median, and dummies 
that indicate the use of financial services are estimates of our parameter of interest 
(equation (2)). I use the dummy “PGA High” because it is highly correlated (75%) 
with the actual values for PGA and has the advantage that it is less subject to 
measurement error. The results presented in this and next sections, however, 
remain qualitatively the same when I use the actual values of PGA computed by 
ZCR for each municipality. Standard errors are clustered at municipality level in 
order to account for potential residual correlations among individuals from the same 
geographic area.  
The first three columns of Table 1.4 present estimations for our parameter of 
interest after controlling for a number of municipality level characteristics from the 
baseline survey. I find that earthquake insurance is the only financial service that 
reduces the effect of the damage associated to ground shaking on PTSD after 
controlling for socioeconomic factors (income, price of rent, years of schooling), 
demography (gender and age), geographic penetration of financial services and 
health conditions at the municipality level. Note that all specifications that include 
earthquake insurance exclude renters, who represent about 10% of the sample. In 
unreported regressions, I find that different categories of savings and investments 
(bank accounts, savings for retirement, stocks and mutual funds) do not reduce the 
effect of PGA on PTSD. In columns (3)-(6), I replicate the previous estimations using 
municipality fixed effects. This specification accounts for the possibility that these 
estimates are driven by environmental factors such as the penetration of formal 
financial intermediaries, population’s biological predisposition to develop PTSD 
symptoms and previous exposure to potentially traumatic events.  
                                                          
10 As noted earlier, the 40-points cutoff is typically used to assess symptoms of PTSD (Davidson et. 
al., 1997). However, the results of this paper are not sensitive to this choice. Indeed, the main results 
remain when the outcome variable is defined for different cutoffs and as the overall sum of scores for 
severity and frequency of each of the symptoms of PTSD. 
15 
 
Although previous tests suggest that individuals from areas that experienced 
high and low PGA have similar characteristics, it is possible that the way in which 
these characteristics affect PTSD is different for individuals that use and do not use 
financial services. In other words, the correlation between use of different financial 
services and PTSD can be driven by factors that affect both the demand for 
financial services and the probability to develop PTSD symptoms after a potentially 
traumatic event. The next sections explore this possibility using a regression 
approach. The estimations of the parameter of interest and statistical significance 
do not have major changes when I replicate the empirical tests using matched 
samples of individuals11. 
 
1.4.2. Alternative Coping Mechanisms 
 
The correlation between use of financial services and PTSD can be driven by 
alternative mechanisms that characterize individuals’ ability to cope with wealth 
losses. In this context, I consider several proxies for socioeconomic conditions, which 
previous studies find to be positively correlated with the use of financial services 
(Campbell, 2006) and negatively correlated with the incidence of PTSD (Galea et al, 
2005). In Table 1.5, I estimate equation (2) after including controls for income, the 
estimated price of rent, a dummy for individuals with a second property, years of 
schooling and demographic factors. Consistent with the previous results, column (1) 
shows that earthquake insurance reduces the effect of PGA on PTSD by nearly 6 
percentage points. Column (2) includes municipality fixed effects and the results 
remain unchanged. Columns (3)-(6) show that having any savings with a financial 
intermediary and the amount in these accounts do not affect PTSD. 
Another way in which the results can be driven by individuals’ ability to cope 
is the incidence of relief efforts after the earthquake. In particular, the absence of a 
significant effect for individuals who have savings and the amounts held in their 
                                                          
11 Specifically, I employed propensity score matching and exact matching techniques. These results 
are available upon request. 
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accounts can be due to the fact that poorer individuals are more likely to benefit 
from relief efforts provided by the government and private organizations, thus 
compensating their lack of savings and access to credit through bank relationships. 
In order to test this hypothesis, I consider a survey question that asks individuals if 
they have received or expect to receive any type of aid from a comprehensive list of 
government and private organizations. The results of Table 1.6 replicate the 
previous estimations after adding dummies that identify individuals from 
households that received or expect to receive aid from public or private 
organizations. The estimates do not experience major changes in sign and 
magnitude. One limitation of this test is that I am not able to distinguish between 
individuals who received and expect to receive aid. However, the empirical 
specifications include socioeconomic, demographic and geographic factors, which are 
the main factors considered for the allocation of financial aid after natural 
disasters. 
Strength of social ties is another potential confounding factor related to the 
ability to cope. The idea is that individuals with stronger social ties can be (i) better 
able to cope with the economic consequences of a natural disaster through informal 
mechanisms (e.g. Henly, Danziger and Offer 2005) and (ii) more likely to use 
insurance products because they have higher levels of trust in financial markets 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008). I 
consider a dummy that takes the value one for individuals that participate in any 
community organization and two dummies that characterize the two most popular 
social organizations (neighbor’s committee and religious organizations). The results 
of Table 1.7 show that although participation in neighbor’s committees reduces the 
probability to develop PTSD in high PGA areas, the correlations between the 
measures of use of financial services and PTSD remain unchanged.  
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1.4.3. Health Conditions and Quality of Health 
Insurance 
 
It is well known that health and wealth are positively correlated (e.g 
Hugonnier, Pelgrin and St. Amour, 2012; Rosen and Wu, 2004). In addition, 
psychological and psychiatric literature suggest that previous mental health 
disorders are a major driver of PTSD (Galea et al, 2005). In this section, I explore 
the possibility that my results are driven by pre-existing mental and overall health 
conditions. I consider questions from the ex-ante survey that ask individuals if they 
had suffered from any mental impairment, if were treated by depression in the last 
12 months and an overall self-assessment of their health condition. Columns (1)-(3) 
from Table 1.8 show that individuals with better health status in the baseline 
survey are less likely to develop symptoms of PTSD in high PGA areas. However, 
the sign and magnitudes for the effect of earthquake insurance and savings on 
PTSD symptoms remain unchanged12. 
I also examine the possibility that the correlation between the use of financial 
services and PTSD is driven by the quality of health insurance. Simultaneous 
holding of health and earthquake insurance can be explained by behavioral traits 
such as risk aversion. Indeed, individuals can be more likely to buy insurance in 
general and thus be less likely to develop symptoms of PTSD because they have 
access to better health care. In columns (4)-(6) of Table 1.8, I introduce a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 for individuals who have private health insurance, 
which in the Chilean context entails access to better health care. I find that the 
results are not driven by differences in the quality of health insurance. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 One limitation of the health controls used in this study is that many individuals with mental 
conditions do not seek treatment. For example, in the US, only 1 out of 3 individuals with a 
diagnosable mental health condition seeks treatment (Kessler et al, 2005). 
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1.4.4. Validity of Survey Responses 
 
Another concern is that individuals from more damaged areas could have 
replied untruthfully to the module used to assess the presence of PTSD symptoms 
and the question of whether they had earthquake insurance. In particular, 
individuals could have (i) overstated their mental burden associated with the 
earthquake (if any) and, at the same time, (ii) said they did not have earthquake 
insurance in a context where they had. There are several pieces of evidence that do 
not support this possibility. First, the ex-post survey includes a question that asks if 
agents received or expect to receive aid to repair their dwelling.  We would expect 
that individuals who behave according to (i) and (ii) are also more likely to say they 
expect to receive public or private aid. The results reported in Table 1.6, and 
already discussed in section 4(b), are inconsistent with the idea of misreporting. 
Second, in a context of misreporting we should observe a lower incidence of 
earthquake insurance in areas that experience high PGA. In contrast, consistent 
with the exogenous location of the earthquake, the incidence of earthquake 
insurance should be similar in areas with high and low PGA. The incidence of 
earthquake insurance in areas that experienced high and low PGA is equal to 6.5%, 
which is consistent with the exogenous location of the earthquake assumption. 
Third, the survey instrument used to determine the presence of PTSD symptoms 
has been validated for the Chilean earthquake (Leiva-Bianchi and Araneda, 2013). 
 
1.4.5. Mechanisms 
 
Previous results suggest that earthquake insurance reduces the probability 
that individuals develop symptoms of PTSD after the earthquake. In this section, I 
conduct additional tests to verify that this result is indeed related to the degree of 
home damage caused by the earthquake. Specifically, I consider two measures of 
the intensity of physical damage to dwellings. “Major Damage” is a dummy that 
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takes the value 1 for individuals from dwellings that had a significant structural 
damage, which may or not compromise the support of the building. “Minor Damage” 
is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from dwellings that need to be 
repaired but the damage does not compromise the structure of the building. Note 
that the survey was conducted through face to face interviews and thus the 
probability of misreporting the extent of damage is low.  
In order to examine if the results for earthquake insurance operate through 
physical damage to dwellings, I estimate a specification that includes the dummies 
for property damage described above and their interactions with the dummy for 
earthquake insurance. If the effects are driven by earthquake insurance, I expect to 
observe that the coefficient associated to the interaction between the measures of 
property damage and the insurance dummy are negative and significant. Since 
property damage is more likely to occur in high PGA areas, I also expect a reduction 
in the magnitude of the coefficient associated to the interaction between PGA High 
and insurance. The results reported in Column (1) of Table 1.9 support these 
hypotheses. Indeed, earthquake insurance reduces by about 12 and 6 percentage 
points the probability that individuals whose dwellings experienced “Major 
Damage” and “Major Damage” develop symptoms of PTSD respectively. In a 
falsification test, I also find that earthquake insurance does not reduce the effect of 
housing damage on PTSD for renters13. 
One potential confounding factor for the coefficient associated to the 
interaction between property damage and earthquake insurance is the physical 
condition of the dwelling before the earthquake. Indeed, the coefficient for the 
interaction term between earthquake insurance and property damage can 
overestimate the magnitude of the parameter of interest if: (i) the physical quality 
of the dwelling captures a dimension of the ability to cope that is not captured by 
my socioeconomic controls, and (ii) individuals from lower quality dwellings are less 
likely to hold earthquake insurance. I explore this possibility in the second column 
of Table 1.8. Ex-ante measures of the quality of the dwelling I consider are: quality 
                                                          
13 This result is available upon request. 
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of the materials of the walls, a self-assessment of the overall physical quality of the 
dwelling, size (number of rooms) and a dummy that takes the value 1 for 
individuals who lived in an apartment. The empirical specification also accounts for 
the socioeconomic and demographic factors discussed in the previous section. I find 
that the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients do not change after 
controlling for the physical quality of the dwellings. The results also remain when I 
introduce municipality level fixed effects in order to control for environmental 
factors (Column (3)).  
 
1.4.6. Magnitude of Point Estimates 
 
In terms of magnitudes, earthquake insurance reduces the probability that 
individuals from dwellings that experienced “Major Damage” develop symptoms of 
PTSD in a range between 66% (=0.122/0.184), in the specification that controls for 
physical characteristics of the property (Column (2)) and 85% (=0.118/0.139) in the 
specification that includes municipality fixed effects (Column (3)). Similarly, for 
dwellings that experienced “Minor Damage”, earthquake insurance reduces the 
probability that individuals develop symptoms of PTSD in a range between 56% 
(=0.51/0.091) in the specification with controls for physical characteristics of the 
dwelling (Column (2)) and 78% (=0.052/0.067) in the specification with municipality 
fixed effects (Column (3)).  
One potential reason why savings and bank relationships are not associated 
with PTSD in more damaged areas is that the magnitude of the damage is too large 
compared with the level of savings or the amount of credit individuals can access 
through their bank relationships. I address this possibility by using an empirical 
specification that considers different degrees of housing damage. Note that the 
median level of savings in the sample is equivalent to three months of rent, which 
should be enough to cover part of a minor damage caused by the earthquake on the 
dwelling. However, consistent with the results of the previous section, having 
savings with a financial intermediary and the amount of these savings do not 
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mitigate the effect of damage on PTSD (Columns (4)-(9)). In unreported regressions, 
I explore the presence of an effect for individuals that have savings equivalent to 
more than 3 months of rent, the median level of savings for individuals who report 
savings, and the results do not change. 
 
1.4.7. Limitations 
 
Data limitations do not allow to examine all potential factors that can drive 
both use of financial services and PTSD symptoms. In particular, there are three 
omitted factors that can compromise the validity of the results for earthquake 
insurance: time preferences, financial literacy and genes. Individuals who are more 
impatient are less likely to hold both precautionary savings and insurance because 
it entails delaying current consumption. In addition, their impatience can reinforce 
the mental burden caused by the earthquake because they have a higher valuation 
for present consumption and are less able to afford it. Similarly, financial literacy 
can increase the demand for insurance (Cole, Gaurav and Tobacman, 2011; Cole et 
al, 2013) and savings accounts (Cole and Zia, 2012). At the same time, more 
financially literate individuals can find it easier to come up with a plan to overcome 
the shock and thus reduce the mental burden it entails. 
An emerging finance literature suggests that participation in financial 
markets can be partially explained by genes (e.g. Barnea, Cronqvist and Siegel, 
2010). Similarly, biomedical literature suggests a potential role of genetic factors for 
mental conditions such as PTSD. Specifically, studies on twin pairs find that nearly 
one third of the variance in PTSD symptoms could be attributed to genetic 
influences (e.g. True et al., 1993, Stein et al., 2002). Unfortunately, my empirical 
design does not allow ruling out the possibility that the correlation between use of 
financial services and PTSD is driven by common genes. In addition, if there are 
genes that explain both financial behavior and the propensity to develop PTSD after 
a potentially traumatic event, the direction of this bias is unknown because existing 
research has not identified the genes that affect both PTSD and financial decisions. 
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One exception is the serotonin transporter gene, where the short version of 
serotonin alleles is positively correlated with PTSD (Skelton et. al., 2011) and 
negatively with risk taking behavior (Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009). Hence, if serotonin 
genes are related to risk taking, my results for insurance will be biased downwards. 
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
I consider one important determinant of individual welfare, namely mental 
health, to empirically study whether the use of financial services (insurance and 
bank accounts) affects individuals’ ability to withstand the damages caused by a 
natural disaster. Using a rich panel of Chilean households and geographic 
differences in ground shaking caused by a large earthquake as a source of 
exogenous variation for the extent of damage, I find that earthquake insurance 
reduces the incidence of PTSD symptoms by more than 50% among individuals who 
lived in properties that were damaged by the earthquake. Since mental health 
conditions entail large costs for individuals and society, this result uncovers an 
important benefit of property insurance. In contrast, I find no significant effects of 
both holding and the amount held in different financial instruments on PTSD 
symptoms. These results suggest a minor role of relationship banking and 
precautionary saving mechanisms for individuals’ mental burden caused by a 
natural disaster. Overall, these results suggest that the welfare impact of financial 
services is driven by the ability to transfer resources across states of the world, but 
not through time. 
The use of mental health outcomes to analyze the welfare gains associated 
with the use of financial services is a promising area for future research. One 
potential route is to study role of financial services for the mental health of 
individuals who face shocks to income and financing needs. Another route is to 
study the extent to which credit and the ability to pay debts affect individuals’ 
exposure to mental health conditions such as anxiety and depression. A major 
challenge for this research agenda is the need for at least two sources of exogenous 
23 
 
variation: one for the economic shock and other for the use of financial services. In 
this context, laboratory experiments that randomize the availability of financial 
services and economic shocks can be particularly fruitful as a first step in this 
direction. 
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1.7. Tables 
Table 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean SD Min Max N
PTSD Index 15.77 22.50 0 136 26079
PTSD 0.13 0.34 0 1 26079
PGA 0.20 0.10 0 0.3 26079
PGA High 0.50 0.50 0 1 26079
Any Damage 0.34 0.47 0 1 26079
Major Damage 0.11 0.32 0 1 26079
Minor Damage 0.22 0.42 0 1 26079
Insurance 0.06 0.25 0 1 26079
Any Savings 0.11 0.31 0 1 25632
Total Savings 0.07 0.33 0 2.5 24666
Total savings / Rent 0.48 2.13 0 15.0 23520
High quality walls 0.93 0.26 0 1 26079
Dwelling's condition -0.03 1.52 -4 1.3 26079
Size 2.95 1.18 1 6 26079
Apartment 0.03 0.16 0 1 26079
Rent 0.17 0.13 0 3 24837
Woman 0.67 0.47 0 1 26079
Age 49 18 0 100 26079
Head 0.46 0.50 0 1 26079
Income 0.36 0.37 0 2.2 19828
Education 8.53 4.31 0 20 25713
Second property 0.12 0.33 0 1 26079
Mortgage 0.07 0.25 0 1 26079
Government aid 0.06 0.24 0 1 26079
Private aid 0.13 0.34 0 1 26079
Improvement to the dwelling 0.30 0.46 0 1 26079
Lived more than 5 years in the municipality 0.95 0.22 0 1 26014
Born in the current municipality 0.58 0.49 0 1 26079
Work or study in another municipality 0.07 0.26 0 1 25712
Part. in any community organization 0.28 0.45 0 1 26079
Overall health status 2009 5.04 1.37 1 7 25638
Chronic Mental Impairment 0.01 0.09 0 1 26079
Treatment for depresion in the last 12 months 0.02 0.15 0 1 26079
Private health insurance 0.05 0.22 0 1 26079
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Table 1.2 
Exclusion Restriction: Magnitude of the effect of ground shaking on PTSD 
after controlling for municipality-level characteristics 
This table presents linear probability estimates of the effect of ground shaking on PSTD after 
controlling for a number of municipality-level characteristics. The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA is the measure of ground shaking used by Zubizarreta et al (2013) 
and discussed in section 3(c). The description of the remaining explanatory variables is in Appendix 
2. P-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality 
level. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PGA 0.700*** 0.676*** 0.677*** 0.645***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Income -0.073 -0.017 -0.092
(0.452) (0.869) (0.384)
Avg. Schooling -0.014 -0.008 -0.003
(0.215) (0.475) (0.753)
Avg. Rent -0.143 -0.102 -0.027
(0.298) (0.430) (0.837)
Avg. Age -0.005** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.050) (0.025) (0.023)
Avg. Woman 0.229 0.203 0.155
(0.417) (0.459) (0.577)
Avg. Insurance 0.117 0.101 0.142
(0.392) (0.415) (0.270)
Avg. Financial Assets 0.562*** 0.437** 0.420*
(0.007) (0.045) (0.050)
Avg. Financial Liabilities -0.052 -0.037 0.011
(0.725) (0.809) (0.940)
Avg. Health status -0.095** -0.083**
(0.023) (0.049)
Avg. Depression -1.127 -1.008
(0.131) (0.166)
Avg. Wall's high quality material -0.180***
(0.000)
Avg. overall quality dweling -0.005
(0.787)
Test PGA coefficient=0.70 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.56
P value 1.00 0.75 0.74 0.46
Observations 26,079 26,079 26,079 26,079
R-squared 0.040 0.046 0.048 0.051
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Table 1.3 
Main Result: Incidence of PTSD by ground shaking and use of financial 
services 
This table presents the fraction of individuals with symptoms of PTSD by use of financial services 
and peak ground acceleration (PGA). PGA is a measure of the ground motion experienced in a given 
municipality due to the earthquake. Columns (2) and (3) present the incidence of PTSD in 
municipalities with PGA below (Low) and above (High) the median respectively. Column (4) present 
Difference-in-Difference (DD) estimators for the effect of the use of different financial services on the 
incidence of PTSD. The first difference compares the incidence of PTSD of individuals that use and 
do not use financial services. The second difference compares the incidence of PTSD across 
individuals that lived in areas of high and low PGA. Description of the variables in the table is in 
Appendix 1. Sample sizes are reported in italics and p-values in parentheses. Standard errors are 
robust and clustered at municipality level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All Low (L) High (H) DD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0.133 0.065 0.201
N 26,079 13,051 13,028
Insurance
Yes (F) 0.112 0.072 0.152
N 1,682 845 837
No (NF) 0.135 0.065 0.205
N 24,397 12,206 12,191
(F) - (NF) -0.023 0.007 -0.053
p-value (0.004) (0.426) (0.000)
Dif-in-Dif -0.060
p-value (0.004)
Any Savings
Yes (F) 0.117 0.051 0.190
N 2,701 1,422 1,279
No (NF) 0.136 0.067 0.203
N 22,931 11,384 11,547
(F) - (NF) -0.019 -0.016 -0.013
p-value (0.005) (0.013) (0.256)
Dif-in-Dif 0.003
p-value (0.861)
Any Debt
Yes (F) 0.134 0.068 0.205
N 7,905 4,109 3,796
No (NF) 0.133 0.064 0.199
N 17,651 8,681 8,970
(F) - (NF) 0.001 0.004 0.005
p-value (0.842) (0.373) (0.501)
Dif-in-Dif 0.001
p-value (0.921)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
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Table 1.4 
Environmental Factors at Municipality Level 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The description of the explanatory variables is 
in Appendix 2. Estimations that measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent 
about 10% of the sample. P-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at municipality level. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PGA High x Insurance -0.069*** -0.054** -0.052**
(0.001) (0.012) (0.018)
PGA High x Any Savings -0.002 -0.016 0.007
(0.895) (0.254) (0.766)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.907) (0.540) (0.475)
PGA High 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.122***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Insurance 0.014 0.007 0.010
(0.248) (0.570) (0.442)
Any Savings -0.015** -0.008 -0.004
(0.023) (0.185) (0.762)
Total savings / Rent -0.002** -0.002* -0.001
(0.017) (0.087) (0.401)
Avg. Income -0.070 -0.070 -0.078
Avg. Schooling 0.010 0.010 0.010
Avg. Rent -0.358*** -0.369*** -0.395***
Avg. Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Avg. Woman 0.162 0.191 0.177
Avg. Insurance 0.038 0.026 0.002
Avg. Financial Assets 0.270 0.335 0.338
Avg. Financial Liabilities 0.039 0.021 0.038
Avg. Health status -0.095** -0.087** -0.076*
Avg. Depression -0.936 -0.992 -1.083
Municipality FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 23,503 25,632 23,520 23,503 25,632 23,520 21,127
R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.114 0.112 0.114 0.116
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Table 1.5 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Factors 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The description of the explanatory variables is 
in Appendix 2. Estimations that measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent 
about 10% of the sample. P-values are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and 
clustered at municipality level. ***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 
10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PGA High x Insurance -0.060** -0.058** -0.063**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.011)
PGA High x Any Savings 0.013 -0.004 0.009
(0.397) (0.779) (0.695)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent 0.002 0.000 -0.001
(0.485) (0.937) (0.830)
PGA High 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.081***
Insurance 0.026** 0.019 0.021
Any Savings -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
Total savings / Rent -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
PGA High x Income -0.038** -0.044*** -0.046*** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.048***
Income 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.000 0.004 0.004
PGA High x Education 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003* 0.002 0.003 0.003
Education -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003***
PGA High x Rent -0.057 0.010 -0.084 -0.028 -0.089 -0.034 -0.027
Rent -0.075*** -0.023 -0.073*** -0.014 -0.072*** -0.009 -0.010
PGA High x Second property -0.003 -0.011 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009
Second property -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
PGA High x Mortgage 0.010 0.030 -0.014 0.008 -0.015 0.007 0.034*
Mortgage -0.022* -0.025** -0.011 -0.018* -0.011 -0.019* -0.027**
PGA High x Woman 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.055***
Woman 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057***
PGA High x Age 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
PGA High x Head 0.026** 0.016 0.025** 0.017 0.022* 0.014 0.014
Head 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.010 0.010
Municipality FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 16,885 16,885 18,490 18,490 18,128 18,128 18,128
R-squared 0.064 0.140 0.064 0.137 0.065 0.139 0.139
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Table 1.6 
Relief Efforts and Probability of PTSD 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The variables included in the socioeconomic 
controls are: income, education, estimated price of rent, second property, mortgage, woman, age and 
household head. The description of the explanatory variables is in Appendix 2. Estimations that 
measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent about 10% of the sample. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGA High x Insurance -0.060** -0.058**
(0.012) (0.017)
PGA High x Any Savings 0.014 -0.003
(0.369) (0.833)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent 0.002 0.000
(0.492) (0.912)
PGA High x Government aid 0.042 0.026 0.045 0.031 0.047 0.033
(0.165) (0.387) (0.137) (0.293) (0.126) (0.278)
Government aid 0.058** 0.033 0.057** 0.031 0.057** 0.033
(0.012) (0.167) (0.018) (0.202) (0.018) (0.184)
PGA High x Private aid -0.016 0.005 -0.015 0.003 -0.016 0.002
(0.490) (0.835) (0.499) (0.880) (0.455) (0.931)
Private aid 0.044*** 0.015 0.045*** 0.018 0.045*** 0.017
(0.010) (0.401) (0.005) (0.270) (0.005) (0.287)
PGA High 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Insurance 0.027** 0.019
(0.044) (0.141)
Any Savings -0.009 -0.004
(0.239) (0.580)
Total savings / Rent -0.001 -0.001
(0.366) (0.520)
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,885 16,885 18,490 18,490 18,128 18,128
R-squared 0.070 0.142 0.070 0.139 0.071 0.141
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Table 1.7 
Social Support and Probability of PTSD 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The variables included in the socioeconomic 
controls are: income, education, estimated price of rent, second property, mortgage, woman, age and 
household head. The description of the explanatory variables is in Appendix 2. Estimations that 
measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent about 10% of the sample. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGA High x Insurance -0.058** -0.058**
(0.017) (0.017)
PGA High x Any Savings -0.002 -0.003
(0.891) (0.848)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent 0.000 0.000
(0.855) (0.870)
PGA High x Part. in any community organization -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.037***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Part. in any community organization 0.014** 0.010* 0.010*
(0.038) (0.086) (0.099)
PGA High x Neighbor's committee -0.040** -0.034** -0.036**
(0.022) (0.044) (0.033)
Part. in neightbor's committee 0.012 0.010 0.010
(0.186) (0.262) (0.259)
PGA High x Religious group 0.003 0.013 0.013
(0.884) (0.493) (0.512)
Part. in religious group -0.017* -0.020** -0.020**
(0.099) (0.040) (0.046)
Insurance 0.018 0.019
(0.159) (0.148)
Any Savings -0.004 -0.004
(0.546) (0.603)
Total savings / Rent -0.001 -0.001
(0.483) (0.505)
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,885 16,885 18,490 18,490 18,128 18,128
R-squared 0.141 0.141 0.138 0.138 0.140 0.139
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Table 1.8 
Pre-existing Health Conditions and Probability of PTSD 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The variables included in the socioeconomic 
controls are: income, education, estimated price of rent, second property, mortgage, woman, age and 
household head. The description of the explanatory variables is in Appendix 2. Estimations that 
measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent about 10% of the sample. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PGA High x Insurance -0.059** -0.058**
(0.016) (0.017)
PGA High x Any Savings -0.003 -0.003
(0.840) (0.861)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent 0.000 0.000
(0.870) (0.833)
PGA High x Chronic Mental Impairment -0.024 -0.034 -0.038 -0.023 -0.034 -0.037
(0.703) (0.574) (0.543) (0.706) (0.581) (0.549)
Chronic Mental Impairment 0.069 0.073 0.076* 0.069 0.072 0.076*
(0.127) (0.104) (0.098) (0.127) (0.105) (0.099)
PGA High x Treatment for depresion in the last 12 months 0.035 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.036
(0.429) (0.348) (0.376) (0.428) (0.346) (0.376)
Treatment for depresion in the last 12 months 0.052** 0.053** 0.055** 0.052** 0.053** 0.055**
(0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020)
PGA High x Overall health status 2009 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Overall health status 2009 -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PGA High x Private health insurance -0.015 -0.025 -0.024
(0.582) (0.353) (0.359)
Private health insurance 0.002 0.008 0.004
(0.854) (0.444) (0.710)
Insurance 0.021 0.021
(0.103) (0.106)
Any Savings -0.003 -0.003
(0.628) (0.631)
Total savings / Rent -0.001 -0.001
(0.566) (0.566)
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,842 18,441 18,082 16,842 18,441 18,082
R-squared 0.149 0.146 0.148 0.149 0.146 0.148
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Table 1.9 
Mechanisms: Property Damage and probability of PTSD 
This table presents linear probability estimates of equation (2). The dependent variable takes the 
value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD according to the Davidson Trauma Scale (Davidson 
et al, 1997) and 0 otherwise. PGA High is a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
municipalities where the PGA was above the median. The variables included in the socioeconomic 
controls are: income, education, estimated price of rent, second property, mortgage, woman, age and 
household head. The description of the explanatory variables is in Appendix 2. Estimations that 
measure the effect of “Insurance” exclude renters, who represent about 10% of the sample. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, ** 
and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PGA High x Insurance -0.034 -0.035 -0.034
(0.136) (0.127) (0.136)
Major Damage x Insurance -0.126** -0.122** -0.118**
(0.020) (0.024) (0.027)
Minor Damage x Insurance -0.051* -0.051* -0.052*
(0.061) (0.062) (0.069)
PGA High x Any Savings 0.005 0.005 -0.013
(0.737) (0.747) (0.411)
Major Damage x Any Savings 0.021 0.022 0.033
(0.476) (0.460) (0.254)
Minor Damage x Any Savings 0.006 0.005 0.013
(0.799) (0.802) (0.543)
PGA High x Total savings / Rent 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.767) (0.789) (0.859)
Major Damage x Total savings / Rent 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.625) (0.637) (0.588)
Minor Damage x Total savings / Rent -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.468) (0.485) (0.662)
PGA High 0.040*** 0.078** 0.038*** 0.069** 0.040*** 0.074**
(0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.037) (0.005) (0.022)
Major Damage 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.139*** 0.180*** 0.178*** 0.136*** 0.181*** 0.179*** 0.139***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minor Damage 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.067*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.068*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.069***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PGA High x High quality walls -0.033 0.004 -0.029 0.008 -0.028 0.013
High quality walls 0.007 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.011 -0.007
PGA High x Dwelling's condition 0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
Dwelling's condition 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001
PGA High x Size -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
Size -0.003 -0.005* -0.003 -0.006* -0.003 -0.006*
PGA High x Apartment -0.033 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 -0.015 -0.011
Apartment -0.006 -0.015 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.006
PGA High x Rent -0.018 -0.012 0.033 -0.042 -0.033 -0.000 -0.047 -0.036 -0.002
Rent -0.056*** -0.051*** -0.009 -0.054*** -0.050*** 0.001 -0.052*** -0.048** 0.007
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality FEs No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 16,885 16,885 16,885 18,490 18,490 18,490 18,128 18,128 18,128
R-squared 0.093 0.093 0.155 0.094 0.094 0.153 0.094 0.094 0.154
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1.8. Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Seismicity Map of Chile (1900-2012) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey, accessed on 03/05/2013 at 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/chile/seismicity.php 
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Figure 1.2: PGA across the Chilean territory  
 
Map of Chile with the estimated peak ground accelerations expressed in g for all counties in 
the study. The asterisk represents the epicenter of the earthquake, a circle denotes a 
county, and the intensity of the color grey shows its estimated shaking intensity. Source: 
Figure 1 in Zubizarreta et al (2013). 
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Appendix 1.1: Measure of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) 
The following module was administered to individuals who are at least 18 years old, 
were present during the interview and were able to respond to the questions on 
their own.  
“During the last week, and because of the earthquake that occurred on February 
27th, have you experienced any of the following conditions? Please, indicate the 
frequency (0 = Not at all, 1 = once only, 2 = 2-3 times, 3 = 4-6 times, 4 = daily) and 
severity (0 = not at all distressing, 1 = minimally distressing, 2 = moderately 
distressing, 3 = markedly distressing, 4 = extremely distressing) of each condition 
according to the tables.”  
  Questions Frequency Severity 
1 Have you ever had painful images, memories, or thoughts of 
the earthquake/tsunami?     
2 Have you ever had distressing dreams of the 
earthquake/tsunami?     
3 Have you felt as though the earthquake/tsunami was 
recurring? Was it as if you were reliving it?     
4 Is there something that remind you of the 
earthquake/tsunami?     
5 Have you been physically upset by reminders of the 
earthquake? (This includes sweating, trembling, racing 
heart, shortness of breath, nausea, or diarrhea.) 
    
6 Have you been avoiding any thoughts or feelings about the 
earthquake/tsunami?     
7 Have you been avoiding doing things or going into situations 
that remind you of the earthquake/tsunami?     
8 Have you found yourself unable to recall important parts of 
the earthquake/tsunami?     
9 Have you had difficulty enjoying things?     
10 Have you felt distant or cut off from other people?     
11 Have you been unable to have sad or loving feelings?     
12 Have you found it hard to imagine having a long life span 
and fulfilling your goals?     
13 Have you had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep?     
14 Have you been irritable or had outbursts of anger?     
15 Have you had difficulty concentrating?     
16 Have you felt on edge, been easily distracted, or had to stay 
“on guard”?     
17 Have you been jumpy or easily startled?     
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Appendix 1.2: Variables 
 
 
(a) Overall Health and Mental Health 
 
Chronic Mental Impairment: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals 
who declare having any of the following permanent conditions: mental or 
intellectual impairment, psychological or psychiatric impairment. Source: Ex-
ante survey. 
Overall health status 2009: Self-reported measure of health condition. The variable 
is obtained from the answer to the following question: "In a scale 1 (very bad) to 
7 (very good), how would you rate your overall health condition?" Source: Ex-
ante survey. 
Private health insurance: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals who have 
private health insurance. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
PTSD Index: Index of post-traumatic stress disorder. This score is computed as the 
sum of individual ratings of severity (0 for “not distressing at all” to 4 “extremely 
distressing”) and frequency (0 for “not at all” to 4 “for every day”) of 17 survey 
questions that address the symptoms of PTSD associated to the earthquake. The 
specific wording of the survey instrument is in Appendix 1. Source: Ex-post 
survey. 
PTSD: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals with symptoms of PTSD. 
Specifically, this variable takes the value 1 for individuals with PTSD Index 
greater than or equal to 40 points. This cutoff is from Davidson et al (1997). 
Source: Ex-post survey.  
Treatment for depression in the last 12 months: Dummy that takes the value 1 
for individuals who were treated for depression within 12 months prior to the 
survey. Source: Ex-ante survey.  
 
(b) Damages caused by the earthquake 
 
Any Damage: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals whose dwellings 
suffered any damage due to the earthquake and 0 otherwise. Source: Ex-post 
survey. Source: Ex-post survey. 
Major Damage: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals from dwellings 
that suffered: (i) significant structural damage which does not compromise the 
support of the building (it is habitable) or (ii) a major structural damage that 
compromises the support of the structure (i.e. high risk of collapse). Source: Ex-
post survey. 
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Minor Damage: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals from 
dwellings that need to be repaired but the damage does not compromise the 
structure of the building. Source: Ex-post survey. 
PGA: Peak ground acceleration obtained from Zubizarreta et al (2013). 
PGA High: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals from areas that experienced 
PGA above the median and zero otherwise. 
 
(c) Use of Financial Services 
 
Any Debt: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that choose any 
alternative between (i)-(xiii) in the following question: “Do you have any of the 
following debts? (choose up to four options): (i) bank credit card , (ii) bank credit 
line, (iii) retail credit card, (iv) bank consumer loans, (v) consumer loan with non 
bank FI, (vi) car loan, (vii) credit from credit unions, (viii) student loans, (ix) 
loans from family and friends, (x) loans from informal lenders, (xi) pawn lending, 
(xii) grocery stores, (xiii) other loans, (xiv) do not have debts and (xv) do not 
know.” Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Any Savings: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that choose any 
alternative from (i)-(viii) in the following question: "Do you have any of the 
following savings or investments? (choose up to two options): (i) savings for 
housing, (ii) savings for retirement, (iii) bank savings account, (iv) CD, (v) 
mutual funds, (vi) stocks or bonds, (vii) loans to friends or relatives, (viii) other 
savings, (ix) do not have savings and (x) do not know." Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Insurance: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that, at the time of 
the earthquake, lived in a dwelling that was insured against earthquakes and 
zero otherwise. Source: Ex-post survey. 
 
(d) Socioeconomic and Demographic 
 
Age: Individual age (years). Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Age squared/100: Age squared scaled divided by 100. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Education: Years of schooling. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Head: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals who are head of their households. 
Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Income: Individual income 1,000. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Mortgage: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals from households 
with a mortgage on their dwelling. 
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Municipality: This variable identifies the smallest administrative area in Chile 
(comuna), which is similar to a US county. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Rent ($1,000): This variable is obtained from the answers to the following survey 
question: "How much do you pay for rent? Or, if you had to pay for rent, how 
much would it be the monthly rent?" Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Renter: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that dwell in a rented 
property. 
Second property: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that have a 
second property. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
Woman: Dummy that takes the value 1 for female individuals. Source: Ex-ante survey. 
 
(e) Quality of the Dwelling 
 
Size: Size of the dwelling (in square meters) 
Apartment: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals that live in an 
apartment. 
High quality walls: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals who live in 
dwellings whose walls are made of: steel, reinforced concrete, brick blocks, 
concrete blocks, stone blocks or wood. This variable takes the value 0 for walls of 
adobe, mud, thatch drywall or any recycling material. 
High quality floor: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals who live in 
dwellings whose floor is made of any of the following materials: concrete, cement, 
wood over concrete, floating floor, etc. This variable takes the value 0 for floors of 
wood (or plastic) that go over dirt or simple dirt floors. 
High quality roof: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals who live in 
dwellings whose roof is made of any of the following materials: concrete slab, 
wood, zinc, slate and tile with or without inner sky. This variable takes the value 
0 for roofs of materials such as disposal (plastic, metal), reed, cane, phonolite or 
straw. 
Dwelling's condition: Measure of the overall condition of the dwelling. It is 
calculated as the first principal component of three categorical variables that 
take the values 0 (bad), 1 (acceptable) and 2 (good), according to individual's self 
assessment of the condition of their walls, floor and roof respectively. 
 
(f) Relief efforts 
 
Government aid: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals who declare 
that repaired or expect to repair their dwellings with support from government 
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agencies and 0 otherwise. This dummy takes the value 0 for individuals whose 
dwellings were not damaged by the earthquake. 
Private aid: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for individuals who declare that 
repaired or expect to repair their dwellings with support from NGOs or 
volunteers and 0 otherwise. This dummy takes the value 0 for individuals whose 
dwellings were not damaged by the earthquake. 
 
(g) Social Ties 
 
Part. in a community organization: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals 
that participate in any community organization. 
Part. in neighbor's committee: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals that 
participate in a neighbor's committee. 
Part. in religious group: Dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals that 
participate in any religious group. 
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2. Financial Literacy and Investments in 
Higher Education * 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Higher education is a key investment opportunity for low income Americans. 
It is a major source lifetime well-being that arises from a higher expected income 
(Avery and Turner, 2012) and a wide array of non-pecuniary benefits (Oreopoulos 
and Salvanes, 2011). Yet, there is little known about the extent to which low income 
students understand and take into consideration the financial aspects of this 
decision. Addressing this question is important because investments in higher 
education are highly complex and this raises the possibility that young individuals 
engage in suboptimal decision making. Indeed, students have to decide whether or 
not they want to enroll in a post-secondary institution, and if they do, they face a 
menu of thousands of educational institutions, dozens of areas of study and several 
sources of financing. More importantly, there is growing evidence suggesting that 
low income students engage in suboptimal enrollment and financing decisions14. In 
addition, although personal finance education mandates for high school students 
                                                          
* I am very grateful to the staff members of the Scholarship Foundation of St. Louis for providing 
access to the data that I use in this study. I am especially thankful to Faith Sandler and Maria 
Rebecchi for the several discussions about the Foundation’s programs and target population; and to 
Rob Foley for his help to access and use the data. I am also thankful for the comments and 
suggestions from seminar participants at Washington University (business economics brown bag) 
and staff and board members of the Scholarship Foundation of St. Louis. 
14 For instance, Bettinger et al (2012) finds that low income individuals who received a streamlined 
process to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) for themselves or their 
children were more likely to apply for financial aid, enroll and persist in college. A large fraction of 
high-achieving low income students do not attend selective schools partly because of lack of 
information about their opportunities at these institutions (Avery and Hoxby, 2013; Hoxby and 
Turner, 2014). Similarly, many low income students rely on credit card debt when they could instead 
borrow federal subsidized loans (Avery and Turner, 2012) and nearly one third of undergraduate 
students who were eligible to receive between up to $4,300 in Pell Grants from the federal 
government in 2007-2008 did not apply. 
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are increasingly popular in the U.S.15, there is little evidence on the extent to which 
they improve career choices, which is arguably the main financial decision faced by 
young individuals. In particular, although several studies use survey data to assess 
the level of financial literacy of high school and college students16, these efforts 
provide little evidence on the extent to which they have specific knowledge about 
the financial aspects of their higher education.  
The first question I study in this paper examines the extent to which low 
income students are familiar with three main financial aspects of their higher 
education: expected income, financing costs and opportunity cost of being enrolled. 
Specifically, I consider a rich survey and administrative data set of low income 
students who received financial aid from the Scholarship Foundation of St. Louis 
(SF). The SF one of the largest U.S. non-profit organizations that supports the 
academic aspirations of post-secondary students in the St. Louis area through 
grants, interest-free loans and financial advice. Overall, I find that students are 
poorly informed about the three main financial aspects of higher education. Indeed, 
only one out of three students has ever tried to determine the monthly income they 
will earn within the first two years after graduation; one out of four students 
correctly ranks the costs of major sources of funding available to them; and, one out 
of four students considers as a cost the income they would forego if they need one 
extra year to earn their degree. 
This low level of financial literacy among students in the sample is surprising 
for a number of reasons. First, these students are academically talented. Their 
average ACT score is 23 points (or 68 percentile in the national rank)17, their 
average high school GPA is 3.4 and 72 percent of them received a recognition for 
their academic achievements in high school. Second, 85 percent of the students in 
the sample passed a semester-long personal finance class in high school, which is a 
                                                          
15 As of 2014, 17 (22) states require that high school students take a personal finance (economics) 
class in high school (Council of Economic Education, 2014).   
16 Some examples of this literature are Chen and Volpe (1998), Bernheim, Garrett and Maki (2001), 
Mandell (2009), Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto (2010) and Cole, Paulson and Shashtry (2013).  
17 This figure is based on high school students who took the ACT test and graduated in the period 
2011-2013. Source: http://www.actstudent.org/scores/norms1.html, accessed on 2/19/2014. 
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high school graduation requirement for students in the Missouri public education 
system18. Furthermore, 69 percent of the students who took this class passed it with 
an “A” grade. Third, more than half of the students have work experience and thus 
have received income from work. Fourth, all students received an acceptance letter 
from a post-secondary institution and thus have been exposed to different sources of 
financing for their higher education, including scholarships and federal loans. In 
addition, nearly 40 percent of the students passed the entrance counseling for 
federal loans, which describes the terms and conditions associated with the use of 
those loans. Fifth, nearly two thirds of the students in the sample have at least one 
member in their family who is or has been enrolled in a post-secondary institution.  
I also find that the association between the level of knowledge about financial 
aspects of higher education with academic achievement, exposure to different 
sources of financial education, financial experiences, socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics is small. 
Having established that students are poorly informed about financial aspects 
of their higher education, I address a second question: to what extent does financial 
education that provides this knowledge affect academic performance and ability to 
receive financial aid? One the one hand, there are several mechanisms that can 
explain a positive effect of such education on academic performance and financial 
outcomes. Financial education can increase academic effort by increasing students’ 
awareness about their potential returns to education and de-biasing the beliefs of 
students who underestimate the opportunity cost of non-academic activities such as 
leisure and paid work. Similarly, since most students are not aware of the costs of 
different sources of financing for higher education, students who participate in the 
workshop can be more likely to keep in good standing with institutions that provide 
the most generous and merit based financial aid. In particular, participation in the 
workshop can improve the quality of applications to renew the financial aid from 
the SF because it offers the loan with lowest interest rate and least stringent terms 
                                                          
18 Missouri is one of the 17 states in the U.S. in which passing a personal finance class is a high 
school graduation requirement (Survey of the States, 2014).  
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available to students in the sample. The average financial aid package for renewing 
students was $6,767 in total ($817 of which are from grants and $5,950 from 
interest-free loans). Raising this capital from unsubsidized federal loans, the next 
cheapest alternative source of financing available to these students, would increase 
their financing costs by about $6,000 over a 10 year repayment period. On the other 
hand, several studies document that financial education programs have small or no 
effects on both financial literacy and financial behavior of participants (e.g. Willis, 
2010; Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, forthcoming). 
I consider a randomized controlled trial that provided a financial education 
workshop to students who received financial aid from the SF for the first time 
during the fall of 2012 and 2013. The main topics covered were future income, the 
cost of different sources of financial aid and the opportunity cost enrollment. 
Instructors particularly emphasized the financial aspects associated with different 
uses of time (work versus study) and the cost differences among differences sources 
of financial aid. The workshop was one hour long and the format was a traditional 
lecture. The impact evaluation of the workshop on academic performance and 
financial aid is only based on students who were first-time recipients of financial aid 
in the fall of 2012 and renewed this aid in the cycle January – April 2013. At the 
time of this study, I do not have yet academic and financial aid data for students 
who were first-time recipients of financial aid in the fall of 2013 because the 
deadline to submit their renewals is April 15th, 2014.  
I find that participation in the workshop increases the average college GPA 
by 0.2 points, obtained as the difference between 3.2 in the treatment and 3.0 in the 
control group. Although the magnitude of this point estimate is one third of a 
standard deviation of the college GPA in the sample, the p-value is 15%. In 
addition, I find that students who participated in the workshop are 11 percentage 
points more likely to receive grants and interest-free loans from the SF for a second 
year. The p-value of this point estimate is 25%. Overall, this evidence on the 
impacts of the workshop is inconclusive due to the small sample size of the first 
round of the experiment. However, if the results of the second cohort of students 
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who participated in this experiment were the same than those from those who 
participated in the first round, the effects would be significant at conventional 
values. Since the experimental conditions of both cohorts of students are similar, in 
terms of students’ observable characteristics and exposure to the workshop, there is 
a high chance to observe significant effects with a larger sample size. 
This paper contributes to the literature that studies financial literacy and its 
determinants. The main contribution to this literature is that I provide new 
measures of financial literacy related to investments in higher education, a main 
financial decision faced by young individuals. Second, this paper is related to a 
growing literature documenting the presence of suboptimal choices in the way low 
income students make their enrollment and financing decisions (Avery and Hoxby, 
2013; Avery and Turner, 2012; Bettinger et al., 2012; Hoxby and Turner, 2014). In 
particular, the results in this paper suggest that financial literacy can be an 
explanation for several puzzling facts documented in this literature19. Third, this 
paper also contributes to a growing literature documenting the effects of financial 
education mandates in the U.S. on financial decision making (Bernheim, Garrett 
and Maki, 2001; Mandell, 2009; Carlin and Robinson, 2012; Cole, Paulson and 
Shashtry, 2013; Hastings, Madrian and Skimmyhorn, 2013; Brown, van der 
Klaauw, Wen and Zafar, 2014). In particular, I provide evidence on the 
heterogeneity of contents covered by different high schools and also the low level of 
awareness about the financial aspects of higher education of students who passed 
these classes. Fourth, and more broadly, the results of the randomized field trial 
suggest a new potential underlying mechanism to understand the relationship 
between financial literacy and wealth accumulation (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; 
                                                          
19 For instance, Bettinger et al (2012) finds that low income individuals who received a streamlined 
process to complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) for themselves or their 
children were more likely to apply for financial aid, enroll and persist in college. A large fraction of 
high-achieving low income students do not attend selective schools partly because of lack of 
information about their opportunities at these institutions (Avery and Hoxby, 2013; Hoxby and 
Turner, 2014). Similarly, many low income students rely on credit card debt when they could instead 
borrow federal subsidized loans (Avery and Turner, 2012) and nearly one third of undergraduate 
students who were eligible to receive between up to $4,300 in Pell Grants from the federal 
government in 2007-2008 did not apply. 
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Behrman, Mitchel, Soo and Bravo, 2012): investments in higher education. Finally, 
this paper also contributes to the vast literature on human capital accumulation by 
challenging the core assumption that individuals understand and take into 
consideration the three main financial aspects of higher education: expected income, 
financing costs and opportunity cost of schooling.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the data. 
In section 3, I show the extent to which students are knowledgeable about the 
financial aspects of their higher education and its relationship with academic 
achievement in high school, exposure to financial education and financial 
experiences.  In section 4, I present the results of a randomized controlled trial that 
evaluates the effect of the financial literacy workshop on students’ educational 
attainment and ability to receive financial aid one year after the workshop. In 
section 5, I provide a discussion about the results. Conclusions are in section 6.  
 
2.2. Data 
 
2.2.1. Sources of Data and Institutional Context 
 
I use survey and administrative data from the Scholarship Foundation of St. 
Louis (SF)20. The SF is one of the largest American non-profit organizations that 
provides grants, interest-free loans and financial advice to low income students in 
order to help them to finance their higher education. In a calendar year, the SF has 
two application cycles: January 1st – April 15th and August 1st – November 15th. The 
sample is from (i) students who submitted an application to the SF for the first time 
in January – April 2012, August – November 2012 or January – April 2013, and (ii) 
were selected to receive grants and interest-free loans. 
Complete applications include a comprehensive application form, high school 
transcripts, the Free Application for Federal Financial Aid (FAFSA), the award 
                                                          
20 http://www.sfstl.org/ 
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letter from the post-secondary institution where the student is enrolling in, essays 
and recommendation letters. From the application form, I obtain socioeconomic and 
demographic information: age, ethnic origin, whether someone else in the student’s 
family has ever attended college and self-reported ACT scores. I use transcripts to 
obtain students’ GPA, the GPA in math courses, information on whether they took a 
personal finance class and the grade in that class. I use the FAFSA to find financial 
information such as the expected family contribution (EFC)21 to student’s higher 
education. From the award letter, I extract information about students’ cost of 
attendance (tuition + room & board) and financial aid package provided by the 
university. 
The selection process for eligible22 students is based on three main criteria: 
academic potential, financial need and personal character. Academic potential is 
measured by grades in high school, ACT scores and academic awards. Financial 
need is defined as the cost of attendance minus the amount of grants, minus the 
amount of subsidized loans from the Federal Government and minus the EFC23. 
The SF provides interest-free loans to students whose financial need is greater than 
zero and smaller than the maximum loan amount. The maximum loan amount for 
the years 2012 and 2013 was $7,000 and $9,000 respectively. The third evaluation 
criterion, character, is determined by developing an overall impression of the 
student as represented by his or her essays, work experience, volunteer activities 
and recommendation letters. Some of the attributes considered in this evaluation 
are evidence of responsible borrowing, responsibility, honesty, good judgment, 
involvement and evidence of sufficient self-expression to succeed in the chosen field. 
Grants and loans have to be renewed on a yearly basis. 
                                                          
21 The EFC is calculated by the U.S. Department of Education based on information provided by the 
students in the FAFSA. For additional information see: https://fafsa.ed.gov/help/fftoc01g.htm 
(accessed on 2/26/2014). 
22 A description of the eligibility requirements can be found at http://www.sfstl.org/financial-aid/who-
is-eligible, accessed on 2/26/2014. 
23 Note that unsubsidized loans are not considered in its calculation of financial need because the SF 
wants students to rely exclusively on grants, subsidized loans and their interest-free loan. 
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Students who are selected to receive grants and interest-free loans for the 
first time are required to attend a one-hour orientation session at the SF’s main 
building. In this orientation, staff members of the SF explain the conditions of the 
loan, the services available to students and also hand out a check with the financial 
aid that students were awarded. In addition, since the year 2012, the SF has 
administered financial literacy surveys to students attending orientation sessions. 
This survey includes the questions I consider to examine the extent to which 
students understand and take into consideration the financial aspects of their 
higher education. In addition, during the sample period, nearly half of the students 
were randomly selected to participate in a financial literacy workshop that provided 
education about the main financial aspects of higher education. At the end of this 
workshop, the SF also administered a second financial literacy survey to measure 
the extent to which students learned the main contents covered in the workshop. 
 
2.2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample of students who were 
first time recipients of grants and interest free loans from the SF. In Panel (a), I 
start considering socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Overall, 63% of 
the students are female and 43% Afro-American. The average expected family 
contribution (EFC) for higher education is $2,814 and 37% of the students 
participated in preparatory programs for low income students in high school24. 
Panel (b) provides descriptive statistics about students’ current enrollment. 
Note that 73% of the students are freshmen, 77% are pursuing a bachelor degree 
and the average cost of attendance is $26,485.  
In Panel (c), I provide descriptive statistics on the academic performance of 
students in high school. The average ACT score is 23 points (68 percentile in the 
                                                          
24 Preparatory programs are conducted by non-profit organizations in St. Louis in order to help 
students to be admitted into post-secondary institutions. These programs provide training to 
improve performance in national tests, financial education and financial resources.  
53 
 
national rank), the average high school GPA is 3.4 and 71 percent of them received 
an academic recognition in high school. Overall, the SF provides financial aid to 
students who are academically talented.  
Finally, Panel (d) presents a characterization of students’ exposure to 
financial education and financial experiences. I find that 85 percent of the students 
in the sample passed a semester-long personal finance class in high school as part of 
their graduation requirements in the Missouri public education system. In addition, 
71 percent of the students who took this class passed it with an “A” grade. 43 
percent of the students passed the entrance counseling for federal loans, which 
describes the terms and conditions associated with the use of those loans. More 
than half of the students have working experience and thus have received income 
from work. Finally, nearly two thirds of the students have at least one other 
member of the family who is or has been enrolled in a post-secondary institution. 
 
2.3. Financial Literacy and Investments in Higher 
Education 
 
2.3.1. Level of Financial Literacy 
 
In this section, I examine the extent to which low income students are 
familiar with three main financial aspects of their higher education: expected 
income, financing costs and opportunity cost of being enrolled in a post-secondary 
institution. The data is from the financial literacy surveys administered by the SF 
during the orientations of 2012 and 2013 described above.  
The results discussed in this section are in Table 2.2. Note that the number of 
respondents is smaller than the number of students who received grants and loans 
because not all students attended the group orientation sessions. In addition, the 
number of respondents from the application cycle January – April 2012 is 
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particularly small because the survey was only administered to students who 
participated in the financial literacy workshop. 
Expected Earnings. Panel (a) reports the fraction of students who have ever 
thought about future income. Specifically, the wording of the question I consider is: 
“Have you ever tried to determine the monthly income that you will earn within the 
first two years of graduation? (a) Yes, (b) No” I find that only one out of three 
students has ever thought about how much they will earn after graduation.  
Financing Costs. Panel (b) presents the fraction of students that correctly 
responded to the questions that measure their level of knowledge about the costs of 
different sources of financing for their higher education. The first survey question 
examines whether students are familiar with the interest rate of federal loans. The 
question was asked to students from the three application cycles considered in this 
study. The specific wording of the question is: “Regarding federal subsidized loans 
available for the next academic year, what will be the interest rate during the 
repayment period? (Your best guess is fine)” I find that only 18 percent of the 
students provided a correct answer to this question. This result is surprising 
because students in the sample have been exposed to federal loans in at least two 
ways. First, the main purpose of completing the FAFSA is to receive financial aid 
from the Federal Government. Second, the award letter of the post-secondary 
institution has a financial aid package that includes federal loans for most, if not 
all, students. 
Although students might not be familiar with the actual interest rates of 
federal loans, they can still be able to compare the costs of different sources of 
financing available to them. In order to address this possibility, the financial 
literacy survey administered in the second application cycle included a hypothetical 
question that addresses students’ cost comparison skills. The specific wording of the 
question is: “Suppose you need to raise $5,000 to finance your next academic year. In 
the following choices, assign numbers from 1 (cheapest) to 7 (most expensive) to rank 
the cost of the following alternatives: (a) Grants, (b) Unsubsidized loans from the 
Federal Government, (c) Loan from the SF, (d) Credit Card, (e) Scholarships, (f) 
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Subsidized loans from the Federal Government (g) Private loans”. Overall, the 
results suggest that students are poorly informed about the relative costs of 
different sources of financing for their higher education. Indeed, only 23 percent of 
the students correctly ranked the five cheapest sources of financing available to 
them (in order): grants and scholarships, loan from the SF, subsidized loans and 
unsubsidized loans. One notable result is that 80 percent of the students said that 
grants and scholarship are the cheapest sources of financing for their higher 
education. In other words, one out of five students does not know that grants and 
scholarships are cheaper than loans. In addition, only 58 percent of the students 
know that subsidized loans are cheaper than unsubsidized loans.  
Opportunity Costs of Enrollment. Finally, I study the extent to which 
students understand the opportunity cost of being enrolled in a post-secondary 
institution. The first survey question I use is: “Suppose your studies take one year 
longer than you expect. How much do you expect this additional year of studies will 
cost you? (Your best guess is fine)” The results in Panel (c) show that the average 
amount reported ($22,315) is slightly lower than the cost of attendance ($26,485). In 
order to determine the elements that students consider in their calculation, the 
financial literacy survey administered to students who applied in the cycle January 
– August 2013 added the following follow-up question: “In the following list, please 
indicate the item(s) you considered to calculate the answer to the previous question: 
(a) total amount of tuition, (b) tuition minus grants and scholarships, (c) a year of 
salary, (d) cost of meals, (e) other (specify)” The most popular choice among students 
is the amount of tuition, with an incidence of 94 percent. However, only one out of 
four students considers as a cost the income they would forego if they need one 
extra year to earn their degree, which is arguably the largest component of the 
opportunity cost of enrollment. 
Summing up, the results of the survey suggest that students are poorly 
informed about three key financial aspects of their investments in higher education: 
expected income, financing costs and opportunity costs of being enrolled. In the next 
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sub-sections, I examine how these results vary with a rich set of student 
characteristics. 
 
2.3.2. Financial Literacy and Academic Achievement in 
High School 
 
The first potential factor associated with financial literacy is academic 
performance in high school. Indeed, measures of academic achievement in high 
school such as cumulative GPA and ACT scores are highly correlated with measures 
of general intelligence or IQ (e.g. Koenig, Frey and Detterman). In addition, there is 
a growing literature showing that higher cognitive skills as associated with 
improved financial decision making (e.g. Stango and Zinman, 2009 and 2011; 
Grinblatt, Keloharju and Linnainmaa, 2011 and 2012; Agarwal and Mazumder, 
2013). In this study, I consider four proxies for academic achievement in high 
school: ACT scores, cumulative GPA, cumulative GPA in math courses and whether 
students received any academic recognition in high school. The results are in Table 
2.3. I find that students with high (above the median) ACT have a slightly higher 
level of financial literacy across the three dimensions considered: expected income, 
financing costs and opportunity costs of enrollment. Cumulative GPA and math 
GPA do not have a clear association with the level of financial literacy. On the one 
hand, students with higher cumulative GPAs are slightly less likely to think about 
future earnings and financing costs but slightly more likely to consider expected 
income as a cost of taking one extra year to earn their degree. Overall, the 
association between academic achievement in high school and knowledge about 
financial aspects of higher education is small. 
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2.3.3. Financial Literacy and Exposure to Financial 
Education  
 
The second potential factor associated with financial literacy is exposure to 
financial education and financial experiences. In Table 2.4, I find that students who 
were exposed to entrance counseling for Federal Loans are slightly more likely to 
have thought about future income but less informed about the cost of different 
sources of financing and the opportunity cost of higher education. I find that 
students who passed their personal finance class with an “A’ are slightly more likely 
to have thought about future income and be better informed about the opportunity 
cost of being enrolled in a post-secondary institution. In addition, in Table 2.5, I find 
that students who took a personal finance class that covered topics related to 
financing of higher education and employment perspectives are slightly better 
informed about the financial aspects of their higher education. In contrast, students 
whose personal finance courses covered budgeting, bank accounts and credit cards 
do not present higher levels of financial literacy. Similarly, Table 2.6 shows that the 
level of financial knowledge does not have major differences for individuals with 
financial experiences such as working exposure and whether other members of the 
family have ever attended a post-secondary institution. Overall, the association 
between exposure to different sources of financial education and financial 
experiences with financial knowledge about the financial aspects of higher 
education is small.  
 
2.4. How does Financial Education affect Investments in 
Higher Education? 
 
Having established that students are poorly informed about the financial 
aspects of their higher education, I examine the extent to which financial education 
that provides this knowledge affects their academic performance and ability to 
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receive financial aid. Specifically, the first outcome of interest is the GPA that 
students received in their post-secondary institution six months after they received 
financial aid from the SF. There are at least two potential mechanisms through 
which a financial literacy workshop on the financial aspects of higher education can 
improve academic performance. First, the workshop can increase academic effort by 
increasing students’ awareness about their potential returns to education, which is 
a subject that only a third of the students in the sample has ever thought about. 
Second, since most students neglect the opportunity cost of being enrolled in a post-
secondary institution, the workshop can increase academic effort by helping them 
realize that they underestimate the true cost of non-academic activities such as 
leisure and paid work. 
The second outcome of interest is students’ ability to receive grants and 
interest-free loans from the SF for a second year. As discussed above, the workshop 
can increase the chances that students continue receiving financial aid from the SF 
and other sources of merit-based aid by improving academic performance. Second, 
one of the subjects that was emphasized in the workshop is that interest-free loans 
from the SF are cheaper and have less stringent terms than other loans available to 
them. Since most students are not aware of the costs of different sources of 
financing for higher education, I expect that those who participated in the workshop 
will be more likely to submit a renewal application and also work harder to meet 
the selection criteria. Indeed, the average financial aid package for renewing 
students was $6,767 ($817 of which are from grants and $5,950 from interest-free 
loans). Raising these funds from unsubsidized federal loans, the next cheapest 
alternative source of financing available to these students, would increase their 
financing costs by about $6,000 over a 10 year repayment period. Thus, receiving 
financial aid from the SF is an economically meaningful outcome for students in the 
sample. 
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2.4.1. Experimental Design  
 
I consider a randomized controlled trial to identify the effects of a financial 
education workshop provided to students who submitted their application to the SF 
for the first time in the cycle January – April 2012. Students in the control group 
were asked to attend one of the hour-long orientation sessions where staff members 
of the SF explained the terms of the interest-free loan and other resources available 
to them. Students in the treatment group were asked to participate in one of the 
two-hour orientation sessions. In the first hour, they received the same information 
that students in the control group. In the second hour, students in the treatment 
group participated in a financial literacy workshop that covered topics related to 
future income, costs of different sources to finance higher education and the 
opportunity costs of being enrolled in a post-secondary institution.  
Students were randomly assigned into a treatment and control group for the 
experiment. For practical reasons, the randomization was implemented over the 
group of shortlisted students, i.e. a larger group than the one that actually received 
financial aid from the SF. Indeed, as soon as students were selected for financial 
aid, they received an award letter that included a schedule with the orientation 
session they were asked to attend. The results of the randomization for students 
who finally received financial aid from the SF are in Panel (a) of Table 2.8. Note 
that the randomization produced a similar sample size for the treatment and 
control groups (73 and 78 respectively). In addition, consistent with a successful 
randomization procedure, I find no systematic differences across a rich set of 
observable characteristics: socioeconomic, demographic, current enrollment, 
academic performance in high school and exposure to financial education and 
financial experiences.  
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2.4.2. Compliance with the Treatment  
 
There are two factors that affected the compliance of students with the 
assignment to the treatment. First, 34 students did not participate in regular 
orientation sessions because they entered late into the program and they were not 
eligible for selection into sessions with and without a financial literacy workshop. At 
this stage, only one-hour orientation sessions were available. The main reason for 
the delay was that students received late acceptance letters from the post-secondary 
institution they were planning to attend. Second, time conflicts or unexpected 
circumstances prevented students from attending the orientation session they were 
asked to attend. In particular, eight students who were assigned into the treatment 
group participated in the orientation sessions of students in the control group. 
Similarly, one student assigned to the control group participated in the orientation 
session for students in the treatment group. Panel (b) of Table 2.8 presents the 
descriptive statistics of students who participated and did not participate in the 
financial literacy workshop.  
 
2.4.3. Financial Literacy Workshop 
 
The financial literacy workshop was one hour long. The main topics covered 
were future income, the cost of different sources of financial aid and the opportunity 
cost enrollment. The specific contents of the workshop were developed and taught 
by staff members of the SF and the Missouri Council of Economic Education.  
The format was a traditional lecture in which instructors conducted the class 
using slides. The class started with a motivation in which instructors asked 
students whether they have ever thought about these financial aspects of their 
higher education25. Next, the instructor discussed the amount of loans from the SF 
and subsidized loans from the Federal Government that students were expected to 
                                                          
25 During the class, most students replied “no” to this question. 
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take during their studies and their most likely repayment schedule. The instructor 
recalled that the SF calculated their loan and grant award in a way that, together 
with scholarships from other sources and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government, they will have enough resources to pay for their educational expenses 
(tuition + room & board). The instructor also encouraged students not to take more 
debt than they needed and to always look for the cheapest source of funding. 
Instructors also asked students not to take too little debt because they can find 
themselves in a situation where (i) they have to rely on more costly sources of debt 
or (ii) take paid jobs that might compromise their academic performance. 
The class continued with a discussion about the costs associated with taking 
too long to earn a degree. Specifically, the instructor emphasized the work/study 
trade-off and the cost of replacing debt with paid jobs. The main message was that 
although work experiences can improve career opportunities, working too much can 
come at the cost of compromising academic performance. The instructor spent 
considerable time discussing the opportunity cost of staying too long in college, with 
particular emphasis on the income they would forego for not participating in the 
labor market, which is neglected by most students. The workshop concluded with a 
summary of the recommendations discussed in the class. After the class was ended, 
students were asked to complete a voluntary follow-up survey to measure their 
degree of learning. 
 
2.4.4. Results 
 
The first outcome of interest is academic performance. The measure of 
performance is the GPA obtained by the student in his or her post-secondary 
institution. This information is from the transcripts that students submitted to the 
SF as part of their renewal application. The results are in Table 2.9, Panel (a). The 
first column presents the regression of GPA on “ITT” (intent-to-treat), a dummy 
that takes the value 1 for individuals who were initially selected into the treatment 
group and zero otherwise. I find that selection into the financial literacy workshop 
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increases the first year by nearly 0.2 points. This effect is significant at the 10 
percent level and the magnitude is equivalent to one third of a standard deviation of 
the average GPA in the sample. 
The main limitation of the previous result is the presence of non-compliers in 
the data. I address this concern using an instrumental variable strategy. 
Specifically, I use the dummy ITT as an instrument for the actual participation of 
students into orientation session. By construction, ITT is a valid instrument for 
participation into the treatment because (i) ITT is uncorrelated with the outcome of 
interest through factors other than participation in the workshop and (ii) ITT 
strongly predicts participation in the workshop. Although (i) is not testable, the 
results of Panel (a) – Table 2.8 confirm a successful randomization procedure. 
Assumption (ii) is confirmed in the first stage of the instrumental variable strategy 
reported in Column (2). As expected, the correlation between ITT and the actual 
treatment variable is large (0.84) and highly significant. The results of the second 
stage are in Column (3). I find that participation in the workshop increases the 
average college GPA by 0.2 points, from 3.0 in the control group to 3.2 in the 
treatment group. Although the magnitude of this effect is one third of a standard 
deviation of the overall GPA, the point estimates are only significant at the 15.4%, 
probably due to the small size of the sample (N=117). The power of this test to 
identify an effect size of 0.2 (1/3 of a standard deviation) at the 10% significance 
level is 50%. However, a second wave of the experiment was conducted for students 
who applied in the cycle January – April 2013. If the results of the experiment 
conducted in this cycle replicate the results from students who applied in the cycle 
January – April 2012, then the average treatment effects on students who 
participated in the workshop (the treated) will be statistically significant at 
conventional levels of significance. Since there are no major differences among 
students from both cohorts (Table 1), this is likely to be the case. 
The second outcome of interest is “Renew”, a dummy variable that takes the 
value one for students who received grants and interest-free loans from the SF for a 
second year. The results are in Table 2.9, Panel (b). The first column presents the 
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regression of “Renew” on “ITT”. The point estimate is 7 percentage points and 
insignificant at conventional levels of significance. Again, I address the non-
compliance challenge with an instrumental variable strategy in which I use ITT as 
an instrumental variable for the indicator of actual participation into the program. 
In column (3), I present the results of the second stage. The point estimates suggest 
that participation in the financial literacy workshop increases by about 11 
percentage points (or 17%) the probability that students are able to receive grants 
and interest-free loans for a second year. This effect is insignificant at conventional 
significance levels. However, if the results of the experiment conducted for students 
from the cycle January – April 2013 mimic the results of the students from the cycle 
January – April 2012, then the average treatment effects of the financial literacy 
workshop on participant students would be statistically significant at conventional 
significance levels. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
  
2.5.1. Why do Students Know so Little About the 
Financial Aspects of their Higher Education?  
 
Higher education is a key investment opportunity for low income Americans. 
Yet, the results of the survey suggest that students are poorly informed about three 
key financial aspects of their investments in higher education: expected income, 
financing costs and opportunity costs of being enrolled. Surprisingly, this 
phenomenon is observed in a group of academically talented students who were 
exposed to different sources of financial education and financial experiences. Why 
do these students know so little about the financial aspects of their higher 
education? I provide three potential (and non-mutually exclusive) explanations. 
The first potential explanation is that financial education programs available 
to students did not encourage them to think about the main financial aspects of 
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their higher education. This can occur because instructors believe that (i) these 
contents will only benefit the minority of students in their school who are college 
bound, (ii) students will receive this advice through an alternative channel or (iii) 
are not aware that this is the main financial decision faced by high school students 
and the potential impact of this education on financial decision making. 
I examine the contents covered in the semester-long personal finance classes 
that students in the sample took in high school. This data is from the financial 
literacy survey administered to students who applied to the SF in the cycle January 
– April 2013, were selected to receive grants and interest-free loans and 
participated in the orientation sessions. Specifically, the survey question I consider 
is: “Please indicate what of the following topics you covered in the personal finance 
(or economics) class you took in high school: (a) credit cards, (b) savings 
accounts/debit cards, (c) budgeting, (d) alternatives to pay for higher education, (e) 
federal loans, (f) employment and income perspectives.” I find that few students 
recall having covered topics related with the financial aspects of their investments 
in higher education. Indeed, Table 2.5 shows that only 34% of the students covered 
alternatives to pay for higher education, 36% studied federal loans and 53% studied 
employment and income perspectives. Only 20% of the students covered these three 
topics during their personal finance or economics class. Overall, the results are 
consistent with the idea that most personal finance classes in high school do not 
induce students to perform a cost-benefit analysis of their investments in higher 
education. 
A second potential explanation is that students were prompted to think about 
the financial aspects of their higher education but have a limited ability to recall. If 
financial aspects of higher education were not emphasized enough or in the right 
way, or were not considered in assignments or tests, then it is less likely that 
students will recall. A similar result can arise if students have a low ability to 
retain. This can occur because students only prepare these topics to perform well in 
tests but not to evaluate their own career choices. 
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A third possibility is that students do not evaluate the financial costs and 
benefits associated with their higher education because vocational and other non-
pecuniary considerations outweigh the financial considerations of their career 
choices. Indeed, for many students, the non-pecuniary benefits of higher education 
can be as large as pecuniary benefits (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). In addition, 
there is growing evidence suggesting that non-academic factors have a large impact 
on student application decisions. The classic example in the U.S. is the role of sports 
success on student applications. In a recent study, Pope and Pope (2014) find that a 
school that has a stellar year in basketball or football on average receives up to 10% 
more SAT scores.  
 
2.5.2. Impact of the Financial Literacy Workshop 
 
Overall, this evidence on the impacts of the workshop is inconclusive due to 
the small sample size of the first round of the experiment. If the results of the 
second cohort of students who participated in this experiment were the same than 
those from those who participated in the first round, the effects would be significant 
at conventional levels. Since the experimental conditions of both cohorts of students 
are similar, in terms of students’ observable characteristics and exposure to the 
workshop, there is a high chance to observe significant effects with a larger sample 
size.  
If the analysis of a larger sample confirmed these effects, one question that 
arises is: how can one hour of financial education have such large effects on 
academic performance and the ability to receive financial aid? This is particularly 
relevant because students in the sample have already been exposed to different 
sources of financial education and several studies show that financial education has 
minor effects on financial literacy and financial behavior (Fernandes, Lynch and 
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Netemeyer, forthcoming)26. There are two main set of factors that can explain 
positive and significant effects of the workshop: (i) contents and (ii) characteristics 
and circumstances of participant students. In order to illustrate this point, I 
examine the way in which this workshop and circumstances of the participant 
address the main barriers to financial education programs identified in the 
literature (e.g. Willis, 2010; Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer, forthcoming).  
The first barrier to financial education is that many individuals have limited 
ability to perform basic math tasks and to retain knowledge, which are basic skills 
to understand and evaluate financial choices. In this experiment, most students in 
the sample are able to perform the basic math operations that are necessary to 
understand the main financial aspects of higher education discussed in the 
workshop. Similarly, students’ ability to retain knowledge is strengthened with a 
financial education program specifically designed to connect the contents to the 
specific circumstances that they face. 
Second, there is a gap between the time in which financial education is 
provided and the timing of financial choices related to this education. In this 
context, decreasing ability to retain knowledge and a changing marketplace reduce 
the potential impact of financial education programs on financial decision making. 
In this intervention, this problem is mitigated because most of the education 
focused the costs and benefits of two actions that students have to make decisions 
on shortly after participating in the workshop: use of time and borrowing.   
Third, the heterogeneity of individual preferences and circumstances reduce 
the ability of financial literacy programs to provide advice that is useful for 
everyone. Similarly, since the link between financial decisions and individual well-
being is not straightforward, it is unclear that financial education will induce 
individuals to make similar financial choices during a specific time frame. In the 
context of the workshop, the education provided is relevant because (i) students 
                                                          
26 Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer (forthcoming) conduct a meta-analysis of the effect of financial 
literacy on financial behavior of more than 200 papers. Their main finding is that financial education 
has a minor role for financial literacy and financial decision making. 
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have to make choices in terms of use of time and credit, (ii) the economic 
consequences of these choices are large and (iii) students were not fully aware of the 
consequences of their choices. In addition, the information and many of the 
recommendations provided during the workshop promote desirable behavior 
regardless of student preferences and personal circumstances27.  
Finally, financial institutions could outmaneuver financial education and 
lead consumer into bad financial choices. This is an unlikely barrier for the program 
studied in this paper because it was provided to a small and disperse group of 
students.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
Higher education is a key investment opportunity for low income Americans. 
Yet, there is little known about the extent to which low income students understand 
and take into consideration the financial aspects of this decision. In this paper, I 
study the extent to which low income students are familiar with three main 
financial aspects of their higher education: expected income, financing costs and 
opportunity cost of being enrolled. Using rich administrative and survey data from 
a large U.S. non-profit organization, I find that the level of financial literacy of low 
income students is low. Indeed, only one out of three students has ever tried to 
determine their income within two years after earning a degree; one out of four 
students correctly ranks the costs of major sources of funding available to them; 
and, one out of four students considers as a cost the income they would forego if 
they need one extra year to earn their degree. This result is surprising because 
students in the sample are academically accomplished (high GPA and ACT scores), 
were exposed to financial education through a semester-long personal finance class 
                                                          
27 For instance, a large portion of the workshop focused on encouraging students to look for the 
cheapest source of financing for higher education (grants and scholarships, loans from the SF and 
subsidized loans from the Federal Government). A second major component of the workshop aimed 
at helped students to understand the opportunity cost of taking too long in college, which is 
especially useful because most students neglect the fact that the income they would forego is a major 
cost for taking too long in earning a degree. 
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and already had related financial experiences (paid jobs and access to several 
sources of financial aid). 
I also examine the extent to which financial education that provides specific 
knowledge on the financial aspects of higher education affects academic 
performance and ability to receive financial aid. Using data from the first round of 
implementation of a randomized field experiment, I find that students who 
participated in an hour-long financial literacy workshop received 0.2 points higher 
GPA in their post-secondary institution than the control group (3.2 versus 3.0). This 
difference is statistically significant at the 15% with a sample size of 117 students. 
In addition, I find that students who participated in the workshop were 11 
percentage points more likely to receive financial aid from the non-profit 
organization than the control group (p=0.25). Overall, these results suggest that 
financial education that focuses on financial aspects of higher education can 
improve students’ academic achievement and their ability to receive financial aid. 
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2.8. Tables 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panels (a) – (e) present average characteristics of students who received grants and 
interest-free loans from the Scholarship Foundation of St. Louis. The application cycles 
considered are: January – April 2012, August – November 2012 and January – April 2013. 
The description of variables is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
Jan - Apr 
2012
Aug - Nov 
2012
Jan - Apr 
2013
All
Number of grant and loan recipients 153 41 132 326
(a) Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.61 0.80 0.61 0.63
African-American 0.39 0.61 0.41 0.43
EFC ($1,000) 2.71 2.51 3.03 2.81
Preparatory Program 0.37 0.46 0.34 0.37
(b) Current Enrollment
Freshmen 0.76 0.41 0.80 0.73
Bachelor degree 0.75 0.85 0.77 0.77
Cost of Attendance ($1,000) 25.5 20.9 29.4 26.5
(c) Academic Performance in High School
ACT score 23 22 23 23
HS GPA 3.45 3.30 3.44 3.43
HS Math GPA 3.05 2.91 3.05 3.04
Received any recognition 0.67 0.63 0.77 0.71
(d) Financial Education and Experience
Personal Finance in HS 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.85
Grade in Personal Finance 3.63 3.62 3.68 3.65
Grade = A in Personal Finance 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.71
Entrance Counseling for Federal Loans 0.40 0.84 0.37 0.43
Working Experience 0.55 0.78 0.56 0.58
First member of the family who attends 
a post-secondary institution
0.32 0.37 0.37 0.35
Application Cycle
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Table 2.2 
Financial Literacy 
Panels (a) – (c) present the fraction of students that correctly answered financial literacy 
questions about the financial aspects of higher education. Note that the number of 
respondents to the financial literacy survey is smaller than the number of students who 
received grants and loans because not all students attended the group orientation sessions. 
The number of respondents for the application cycle January – April 2012 is particularly 
small because the financial literacy survey was only administered to students who 
participated in the workshop. 
 
 
Jan - Apr 
2012
Aug - Nov 
2012
Jan - Apr 
2013
All
Number of respondents 47 19 107 173
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income . 0.40 0.32 0.33
(b) Costs of Financing
Knows the interest rate for federal subsidized loans. 0.13 0.15 0.24 0.20
Correctly ranks the costs of the following financing 
sources: grants, scholarships, loans from the 
Scholarship Foundation, subsidized and unsubsidized 
loans from the Federal Government, credit cards and 
private loans.
. . 0.23 0.23
Scholarships and grants are the cheapest source of 
financing.
. . 0.79 0.79
The three cheapest sources of financing are (in 
order): scholarships, grants and loans from the 
Scholarship Foundation.
. . 0.74 0.74
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper than 
unsubsidized loans.
. . 0.58 0.58
The four cheapest sources of financing are (in 
order): scholarships, grants, loans from the 
Scholarship Foundation and subsidized loans from 
the Federal Government.
. . 0.36 0.36
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Cost of staying one extra year enrolled in a post-
secondary institution
32.13 11.18 19.98 22.31
Tuition is one of the costs of being one extra year in 
college.
. . 0.93 0.93
Foregone income is one cost of staying one extra year 
in college
. . 0.25 0.25
Application Cycle
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Table 2.3 
Financial Literacy and Academic Achievement in High School 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered to the financial literacy 
questions according to their academic achievement. The cutoffs represent the median value 
of ACT, GPA and math GPA in high school respectively. The specific wording of the 
financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
ACT<23 ACT>23 GPA<3.5 GPA>3.5
Math 
GPA<3.0
Math 
GPA>3.0
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.28 0.39 0.38 0.27 0.37 0.26
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.18 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.21
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.19 0.29 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.16
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.75 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.73
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.68 0.82 0.73 0.74 0.77 0.68
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.58 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.57
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.32 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.32
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.25 0.27 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.30
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Table 2.4 
Financial Literacy and Financial Education 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered the financial literacy 
questions according to their exposure to the entrance counseling for federal loans and their 
performance in the mandatory personal finance class they took in high school. The specific 
wording of the financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.28 0.40 0.28 0.32
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.20 0.21 0.19 0.22
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.24 0.22 0.26 0.25
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.79 0.80 0.83 0.79
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.73 0.76 0.70 0.77
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.61 0.54 0.61 0.61
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.38 0.34 0.35 0.41
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.29 0.20 0.17 0.25
Entrance counseling for 
Federal Loans
Passed Personal Finance 
Class with an "A"
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Table 2.5 
Financial Literacy and Contents Covered in the Personal Finance Class 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered the financial literacy 
according to their exposure to specific topics in the personal finance class they took in high 
school. The specific wording of the financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Respondents 24 82 13 93 15 91
% 0.23 0.77 0.12 0.88 0.14 0.86
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.42 0.29 0.54 0.29 0.47 0.30
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.25 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.24
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.17 0.24 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.23
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.63 0.84 0.54 0.83 0.67 0.81
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.63 0.77 0.54 0.76 0.67 0.75
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.50 0.60 0.46 0.59 0.47 0.59
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.29 0.38 0.23 0.38 0.33 0.36
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.38 0.21 0.31 0.24 0.13 0.26
Credit Cards Bank Accounts Budgeting
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Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Financial Literacy and Contents Covered in the Personal Finance Class 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered the financial literacy 
according to their exposure to specific topics in the personal finance class they took in high 
school. The specific wording of the financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 70 36 49 57 67 39
% 0.66 0.34 0.46 0.54 0.63 0.37
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.29 0.39 0.29 0.35 0.31 0.33
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.23 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.24 0.26
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.21 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.21 0.26
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.77 0.83 0.73 0.84 0.79 0.79
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.73 0.75 0.67 0.79 0.78 0.67
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.54 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.64
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.36 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.23 0.28 0.22 0.26 0.28 0.18
Financing of 
Higher 
Education
Federal Loans
Employment 
Perspectives
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Table 2.6 
Financial Literacy and Financial Experiences 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered the financial literacy 
questions according to their exposure to two different financial experiences: work and 
having a member of the family who has ever attended a post-secondary institution. The 
specific wording of the financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.27 0.37 0.36 0.29
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.19 0.21 0.18 0.24
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.30 0.18 0.23 0.24
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.83 0.77 0.78 0.81
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.76 0.72 0.74 0.74
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.65 0.52 0.43 0.81
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.46 0.30 0.32 0.43
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.28 0.23 0.23 0.29
Work Experience
First member of the family 
who attends a post-secondary 
institution
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Table 2.7 
Financial Literacy, Socioeconomic and Demographic Background 
This table presents the fraction of students that correctly answered the financial literacy 
questions according to their socioeconomic and demographic background. The specific 
wording of the financial literacy questions is in section 3(a). 
 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes No Yes
(a) Expected Income
Has ever thought about future income 0.43 0.28 0.43 0.22 0.39 0.31
(b) Costs of Financing
knows the interest rate for federal 
subsidized loans.
0.14 0.24 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.21
Correctly ranks the costs of the following 
financing sources: grants, scholarships, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation, 
subsidized and unsubsidized loans from 
the Federal Government, credit cards 
and private loans.
0.30 0.19 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.22
Scholarships and grants are the 
cheapest source of financing.
0.85 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.92 0.76
The three cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants and 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation.
0.83 0.69 0.77 0.72 0.84 0.71
Federal subsidized loans are cheaper 
than unsubsidized loans.
0.55 0.60 0.52 0.69 0.60 0.57
The four cheapest sources of financing 
are (in order): scholarships, grants, 
loans from the Scholarship Foundation 
and subsidized loans from the Federal 
Government.
0.45 0.31 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.35
(c) Opportunity Cost of Enrollment
Foregone income is one cost of staying 
one extra year in college
0.23 0.27 0.31 0.23 0.24 0.26
Female Afro-American Freshman
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Table 2.8 
Randomization 
This table presents the results of the randomization. The results of the randomization for 
students who received financial aid from the SF are in Panel (a). Panel (b) presents the 
descriptive statistics of students who participated and did not participate in the financial 
literacy workshop. The description of variables is in section 3(a).  
 
 
 
 
 
C T T - C C T T - C
Sample size 78 73 68 49
Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics
Female 0.64 0.55 -0.09 0.63 0.55 -0.08
African-American 0.37 0.41 0.04 0.40 0.44 0.04
EFC ($1,000) 2.68 2.84 0.16 2.49 3.69 1.20
Preparatory Program 0.35 0.40 0.05 0.38 0.43 0.05
Current Enrollment
Freshmen 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.74 0.86 0.12*
Bachelor degree 0.76 0.73 -0.03 0.76 0.76 -0.01
Cost of Attendance ($1,000) 25.60 25.62 0.02 25.85 26.06 0.21
Academic Performance in High School
ACT score 22.47 23.20 0.73 22.76 23.19 0.43
HS GPA 3.45 3.46 0.01 3.45 3.47 0.02
HS Math GPA 3.01 3.07 0.06 2.98 3.10 0.12
Received any recognition 0.69 0.67 -0.02 0.71 0.67 -0.03
Financial Education and Experience
Personal Finance in HS 0.90 0.81 -0.10 0.88 0.83 -0.05
Grade in Personal Finance 3.66 3.64 -0.02 3.65 3.67 0.02
Grade = A in Personal Finance 0.73 0.74 0.01 0.71 0.75 0.04
Working Experience 0.55 0.56 0.01 0.51 0.63 0.12
First member of the family who attends a post-
secondary institution
0.35 0.29 -0.06 0.31 0.27 -0.04
Intent to Treat Compliance
Panel (a) Panel (b)
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Table 2.9 
Impact Evaluation of Financial Literacy Workshop 
This table presents the effect of participation in the financial literacy workshop on college 
GPA (Panel (a)) and the probability to receive financial aid from the SF for a second year 
(Panel (b)). Column (1) presents OLS estimates of intent to treat effects. Column (2) 
presents the effect of intent to treat on participation in the workshop. Column (3) presents 
instrumental variable estimates of the effect associated with the participation in the 
financial education program. 
 
Panel (a) 
 
 
Panel (b) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
GPA Treatment GPA
(OLS) (IV-First stage) IV-Second stage
Intent to treat 0.185* 0.841***
(0.087) (0.000)
Treatment 0.207
(0.154)
Constant 3.000*** 0.016 2.990***
(0.000) (0.320) (0.000)
Observations 128 117 106
R-squared 0.023 0.725 0.000
(1) (2) (3)
Renew=1 Treatment Renew=1
(OLS) (IV-First stage) IV-Second stage
Intent to treat 0.072 0.841***
(0.341) (0.000)
Treatment 0.114
(0.250)
Constant 0.654*** 0.016 0.670***
(0.000) (0.320) (0.000)
Observations 151 117 117
R-squared 0.006 0.725 0.000
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3. Civic Capital and Use of Bank Accounts* 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Nearly half of the world is unbanked, i.e. live in households where none of its 
members has a deposit account with a formal financial intermediary (Cull, 
Demirguc Kunt and Morduch, 2013). More surprisingly, many individuals do not 
use of deposit accounts and other financial services even in contexts of minor supply 
side barriers associated with take up and use of these accounts28. Understanding 
the demand for deposit accounts is important for several reasons. First, deposit 
accounts can help households to improve their allocation of resources through time 
and across states of the world. Indeed, these accounts can be used as a storage 
technology to build assets (e.g. rainy day funds, strategic liquidity, homeownership 
and education), a mean to transform payments into usable forms, a commitment 
device to address spending temptations and a mechanism to build relationships 
with formal financial intermediaries. In contrast, individuals who do not use formal 
financial services are more likely to rely on informal financial vehicles that are 
more expensive and insecure (Collins et al, 2009). Second, there is a strong belief 
among policy makers and development agencies that the use of basic financial 
services is critical for poverty alleviation and wealth accumulation (e.g. CGAP, 
2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Thus, understanding the demand for 
deposit accounts is a key input for the design and implementation of policies that 
                                                          
* I am very grateful to Radha Gopalan, Ohad Kadan, Anjan Thakor, Jialan Wang and participants of 
the finance brown bag seminar at Olin business school for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
I alone am responsible for the contents in this article.  
28 For instance, only 40% of the Indonesian population holds a deposit account with a formal 
financial institution despite the large geographic penetration of bank branches, low cost and 
minimum paperwork requirements to open a bank account (Cole and Zia, 2011). In the US, nearly 
8.2% of the households are unbanked and about 20% rely on financial services that are not provided 
by the mainstream banking industry (FDIC, 2012). In India, only a small fraction of small farmers 
takes up a highly subsidized rainfall insurance products despite their income is highly exposed to 
weather shocks (e.g. Gine et al, 2010).  
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promote financial inclusion – the extent to which households take up and use 
formal financial products. 
In this paper, I use a rich survey data set of Chilean households to study if 
civic capital, defined as the set of values and beliefs within a community that 
promote cooperation for socially valuable purposes (Banfield, 1958; Coleman, 1990; 
Putnam, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011), affects the use of deposit 
accounts among Chilean households. The main hypothesis of this study is that civic 
capital helps to alleviate two frictions that can limit the demand for deposit 
accounts: trust and information. Indeed, areas with higher levels of civic capital 
have stronger social and moral norms which help to sustain higher levels of trust 
within a community. Since financial services are trust intensive contracts, one 
would expect a higher demand for deposit accounts in areas with higher levels of 
civic capital. Similarly, civic capital can also increase the demand for deposit 
accounts by facilitating the flow of information and awareness about prices and 
potential uses of such accounts. 
The Chilean context provides a useful setting to examine the role of civic 
capital for use of savings accounts, the most widely available type of deposit account 
in the country. First, only 22% of Chilean households had a savings account in 2009, 
even though supply side barriers identified by prior studies (e.g. World Bank, 2007) 
do not seem to be binding for most Chilean households. Indeed, most municipalities 
have a bank branch were individuals can obtain a savings account at no monetary 
cost, the paperwork required to obtain those accounts is minimum and savings are 
insured by the government29. Even in the area with the largest degree of 
penetration of bank branches, only 31% of households has a savings account. 
Second, in addition to the benefits described above, Chilean savings accounts can be 
used to make transactions at points of sale and ATMs thanks to the debit card 
associated to most accounts. In addition, the use of deposit accounts can help to 
                                                          
29 The deposit insurance covers 90% of individual deposits held with formal financial intermediaries. 
The maximum amount covered in 2009 was approximately $5,000.  
84 
 
reduce administrative cost of paying out transfers from governments to 
individuals30.  
The empirical proxy for civic capital is the rate of registration to vote in 
political elections for individuals who are 18-19 years old. The motivation for this 
measure of civic capital is the presence of two institutional features of the Chilean 
electoral system: voluntary registration and compulsory voting for registered 
individuals. Indeed, registered individuals were required to vote in all future 
presidential, parliament and municipality elections. Since there are no explicit 
monetary payoffs associated with voting decisions, I interpret registration rates as 
an outcome of civic capital. I do not use the registration rate for the entire 
population in age to vote because it does not account for changes in social norms 
and beliefs of individuals who already registered (e.g. depreciation). In addition, 
electoral decisions of young individuals capture the extent to which social norms, 
values and beliefs in the community are passed on to the youth. Two main channels 
identified by the theoretical and empirical literature are the family (Bisin and 
Verdier, 2001; Tabellini, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008) and education 
(Algan, Cahuc and Shleifer, 2012). Both of these mechanisms are likely to be at play 
for the Chilean case. Indeed, in a nationally representative study, 97% of 
individuals between 15-19 years old live with their parents and mention their 
immediate family as the most influential on their political decisions (INJUV, 2009). 
Furthermore, high school graduation is compulsory until individuals turn 18 years 
old. This evidence mitigates the concern that registration to vote of young 
individuals might not be representative of the level of civic capital within a 
community.  
I find that households from areas with higher levels of civic capital are more 
likely to have bank savings accounts and have a larger amount of savings in these 
accounts. In terms of magnitudes, moving from a municipality in the 10 percentile 
                                                          
30 In the U.S., for instance, the Federal Government provides about 140 million benefit checks per 
year. If all of these were converted to direct deposit, it would save taxpayers more than $130 million 
annually. Source https://www.godirect.gov/gpw/About.gd?cid=21105#should-taxpayers-care accessed 
on 7/24/2012. 
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to another in the 90 percentile of civic capital is associated with an increase in the 
probability of savings account holding between 2.1 and 3.1 percentage points. 
Similarly, conditional on having a positive amount of deposits in the savings 
account, moving from a municipality in the 10 percentile to another in the 90 
percentile of civic capital is associated with an increase 5.6 and 8 percentage points 
relative to the median savings to monthly income ratio (1.44). I verify that my 
measure of civic capital is not driven by differences in religious beliefs, the presence 
of civic organizations with legal personality and municipality-level factors such as 
income, schooling or the effectiveness of legal enforcement. Consistent with civic 
capital operating through increased trust and information in the community, the 
results are driven by households who are less intensive users of communication and 
information technology devices (e.g. phone, computer and internet) and also by 
households where the respondent have no studies beyond high school. Taken 
together, the results suggests that civic capital helps to overcome education and 
informational barriers associated to the access and use of savings accounts. 
This study contributes to the literature that relates the role of social factors 
for the use of financial services. Most of this literature has focused on the role of 
social factors for access to credit31 and stock market participation32. In contrast, 
there are few studies examining the role of social factors for access to and use of 
savings or transactional financial services provided by mainstream bank 
institutions33. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study on the effect civic 
                                                          
31 Some examples of the theoretical literature are Ghatak (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), 
Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994) and Stiglitz (1990) who discuss the role of joint lending on 
access to credit. Some recent empirical studies on the effect of social factors on access to credit are 
Ahlin and Townsend (2007), Karlan (2005 and 2007), Carpena, Cole, Shapiro and Zia (2010) and 
Giné, Krishnaswamy and Ponce (2011). 
32 Among the factors that have proven to matter for stock market participation are: trust (Guiso, 
Sapienza and Zingales, 2008), religious beliefs (Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2011), political orientation 
(Kaustia and Torstila, 2011) and social interactions (Hong and Kubic, 2004; Hong, Kubic and Stein, 
2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2007 and Brown et al, 2008). 
33 One exception is Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), who document a positive effect of social 
capital on the use of checks among Italian households, and Duflo and Saez (2003), who provide 
evidence for the role of social interactions on the choice of retirement plans in a large U.S. university. 
86 
 
capital on the probability that households have a bank savings account and the 
level of investments in those accounts.  
Second, this paper also provides an estimate of the effect of the “stock” of civic 
capital on use of bank accounts and thus complements field experiments that 
evaluate the impact of artificially-induced social interactions on individual financial 
decisions (e.g. Duflo and Saez, 2003; Karlan, 2005 and 2007). In this context, 
studying the role of the stock of civic capital is particularly relevant because the 
main mechanisms through which civic capital is accumulated are intergenerational 
transmission and education. Third, this paper shows that civic capital matters for 
the use of bank savings accounts for a representative sample of households in an 
emerging country and in a context of minor supply side barriers. Fourth, I use rich 
survey data from a nationally representative sample of Chilean formal population. 
This data allows me to control for a number of demographic and behavioral factors 
that are likely to affect both use of deposit accounts and the stock of civic capital in 
a certain area. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two presents an empirical 
model for use of deposit accounts. Section three discusses the institutional 
background of deposit accounts in Chile and the measure of civic capital. Section 4 
describes the data. Section 5 presents the main results and robustness checks. 
Section 6 examines the cross sectional variation. I conclude in section 7. 
 
3.2. Empirical Framework 
 
3.2.1. Empirical Model of Deposit Account Choice 
 
The empirical framework considers that households decide whether to have a 
deposit account by performing a cost-benefit analysis. The net benefit associated 
with the use of deposit accounts for a household “k” is given by the following 
equation: 
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𝑌𝑘
∗ = ∑ 𝐵𝑖,𝑘𝑖 − ∑ 𝐶𝑗,𝑘𝑗      (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑘
∗ is the net benefit associated with the use of deposit accounts, 
 𝐵𝑖,𝑘 represents the present value of each of the benefits associated with the take up 
and use of deposit accounts. Indeed, deposit accounts provide a storage technology 
to build assets (e.g. liquid savings, homeownership and education), a mean to 
transform payments into usable forms, a commitment device to address spending 
temptations and a mechanism to build relationships with formal financial 
intermediaries. These accounts are also useful as a mean of payment thanks to 
debit cards associated to these accounts that can be used in ATMs and points of 
sale. Individuals have access to customer service both online and over the phone. 
These services allow individuals to obtain information about the account, make 
transactions and receive payments, all of which reduces transaction costs. Finally, 
some deposit accounts pay interests and benefit from deposit insurance from the 
government. 
 Similarly, 𝐶𝑗,𝑘 represents the present value of each of the costs associated 
with the use of deposit accounts. Regarding take up, individuals incur in the cost of 
transportation, time associated with the wait to be assisted by a customer service 
representative, time filling out forms and a set-up fee (although this is usually 
waived). Using and not using the account entail fees such as: maintenance fees, fees 
associated to withdrawals from the teller and ATM, fees that trigger when 
minimum balance is too low, fees for using an ATM from a different bank, fees for 
online transfers and payments. Individuals also reduce the liquidity of their savings 
by facing caps on the amount they can withdraw from an ATM, the ATM can run 
out of money and many services are limited to office hours of the bank. Individuals 
also incur in transportation costs associated to the access services such as ATM and 
availability of customer service representatives. When debit cards are lost or stolen, 
individuals have to give notice to the financial intermediary and go through a 
process in order to access to their resources and restore the card. Finally, having a 
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deposit account entails the mental burden associated with keeping track of the 
balance in the account. 
 
3.2.2. How can Civic Capital Affect the Use of Deposit 
Accounts?  
 
Civic capital refers to the set of cultural norms and beliefs that promote 
cooperation among individuals to overcome the free rider problem in the pursuit of 
socially valuable activities (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011). Communities of 
high voluntary voter turnout, where people do not claim benefits they are not 
entitled to, do not avoid paying fares on public transportation, do not cheat on taxes, 
do not accept bribes, actively participate in public meetings and work with political 
parties are examples of communities with high levels of civic capital34.  
The level of civic capital can affect the take up and use of deposit accounts 
through at least two mechanisms. First, thanks to the strength of social networks in 
their community, individuals from areas with higher civic capital can have access to 
more and better information at lower costs. Thus, they are more likely to know 
prices, conditions and potential uses of these accounts. Second, civic capital 
enhances the level of generalized trust or trust outside the circle of family and 
friends (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004 and 2011). Since financial contracts 
involve that one party gives resources today in exchange of a promise to receive 
resources back in the future, the party that provides resources today must believe 
that in the future will receive what was promised to. In communities with high 
levels of civic capital, people are more prone to behave cooperatively because of 
                                                          
34 This is a refinement of the concept of social capital recently developed by Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2011) as a response to the critiques to the excessively broad definition of social capital (e.g. 
Solow, 1995).  Indeed, civic capital has non-negative payoffs since only considers the values and 
beliefs that “help” members of a community to overcome collective problems. Civic capital can be 
accumulated and depreciated through at least two mechanisms: norms and moral values conveyed 
with education (Coleman, 1990) or as a result of the presence of social networks that enhance the 
effectiveness of social sanctions (Portes, 1998). Civic capital is also durable and can be measured. 
Therefore, civic capital has the distinctive properties of capital and is distinct from other known 
forms of capital (such as human capital) because of its “social” dimension. 
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norms, moral values and the presence of social networks that enhance the 
effectiveness of social sanctions. Hence, households who live in areas of high civic 
capital can be less likely to be cheated by other members of their community. In 
particular, households from areas of high civic capital are less likely to be cheated 
by financial institutions and financial institutions’ employees in their community 
and thus should be more prone to engage in financial contracts than those from 
areas of low civic capital. Further, individuals from areas with higher civic capital 
can be more likely to use formal financial instruments because they are simply 
more willing to deal with formal institutions like banks. In this paper, I test the 
common prediction that households from areas of higher civic capital are more 
likely to have a savings account and to hold larger amounts in those accounts.  
 
3.3. Context  
 
3.3.1. Access to Savings Accounts in Chile 
 
Supply side barriers for take up and use of savings accounts identified in the 
literature (e.g. World Bank, 2008) do not seem to be binding for Chilean households. 
First, while geographic access to bank branches is heterogeneous across the 
country, most Chilean municipalities have a bank branch that allows individuals to 
open and use bank savings accounts. Second, although there is wide variation in 
prices and conditions for those accounts across different financial institutions, 
individuals can open and use a savings account at no monetary cost in all 
municipalities with a bank branch. Third, there are no major eligibility barriers. In 
order to open a bank account, individuals are only required to show a valid 
identification card which is widely held by Chilean citizens across the country. 
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3.3.2. Measure of Civic Capital  
 
The ideal measure of civic capital satisfies the following two conditions: (i) it 
is a good proxy for civic capital in a given area and (ii) it is not correlated with 
economic or legal factors that can also affect the probability that a household has a 
bank savings account. The empirical proxy for civic capital is the rate of registration 
to vote in political elections for individuals who are 18-19 years old at municipality 
level35. The rationale for this measure builds on two main institutional features of 
the Chilean electoral system: voluntary registration and compulsory voting for 
registered individuals. Responsibilities for registered individuals include the 
obligation to vote in presidential, parliament and municipal elections as well as to 
work in the ballot if they are randomly selected to do so. Registration is irreversible 
and individuals can be fined for either not voting or not working in the ballot unless 
they provide an excuse such as illness or being more than one hundred miles away 
from the location where they are required to vote. In this context, since there are no 
private benefits associated with registration decisions, the registration rate can be 
interpreted as an outcome measure of social norms and beliefs that promote 
cooperation of individuals between 18 and 19 years of age across Chilean 
municipalities. 
One limitation of the proxy for civic capital is that it is based on the electoral 
decision of individuals between 18 and 19 years of age and it might not be 
representative of the level of civic capital for the entire municipality. However, 
electoral decisions of young individuals can be interpreted as the extent to which 
civic values and beliefs of the community and the family are passed on to new 
generations. Indeed, two main transmission mechanisms identified in the literature 
are family background (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Tabellini, 2008; Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales, 2011) and education (Coleman, 1990). In particular, the latest 
Chilean survey on the youth (INJUV, 2009), suggests that parents and other 
                                                          
35 Municipalities are the smallest geographical and administrative units in the country. 
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relatives are the most influential on political decisions of individuals between 15-19 
years of age. This figure is consistent with the fact that 97% of individuals between 
15-19 years old live with their families (INJUV, 2009).  
One advantage of the proxy for civic capital is that there are no explicit 
economic or legal penalties for not registering. Moreover, it is unlikely that this 
measure is affected by last minute enthusiasm or the vividness of any “informal” 
economic incentive provided by political incumbents as it might occur in settings 
with voluntary voting schemes. Indeed, citizens must register 120 days before an 
election in order to be able to vote in that election and political campaigns can start 
only 30 days before the ballot. Therefore, most candidate efforts are targeted 
towards individuals who are already registered to vote. 
There are two reasons why the registration rate for individuals with age in 
the range of 18 and 19 years is more appropriate than the registration rate for the 
whole population in age to vote as a measure of civic capital. First, since the 
registration decision is irreversible, the registration rate for the overall population 
does not account for potential depreciation in the level of civic capital. Indeed, the 
set of values and beliefs that led individuals to register in the electoral service ten 
years ago might have changed. Second, individuals who are registered to vote in a 
given municipality might not update their address in the electoral service when 
they move to a different municipality, aspect that is likely to be more pervasive for 
older cohorts of registered individuals.  
As any measure of civic capital, our proxy is subject to measurement error. 
Ideally, one would construct a composite measure out of different proxies for civic 
capital (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011). However, geographic differences in 
the pervasiveness with which people claim benefits they are not entitled to, avoid 
paying fares on public transportation, cheat on taxes or accept bribes is partly due 
to the strength of legal enforcement and economic benefits associated with these 
behaviors. In this context, measurement error will bias downwards our estimates 
and thus they can be interpreted as a conservative estimate of the correlation 
between civic capital and the probability that a household has a savings account. 
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3.4. Data 
 
The measure of civic capital, labeled as CIVIC, is the ratio between the 
number of individuals between 18 and 19 years of age who are registered to vote 
and the total population in that age range for the year 2008. The descriptive 
statistics of CIVIC and other variables used in this paper are in Table 3.1. The 
median household lives in areas where 7.3% of the individuals between 18 and 19 
years of age were registered to vote in 2008. One fourth of the households live in 
areas where the registration rate is below 4.2% and one fourth where the 
registration rate is above 12.4%. 
Household data is from the Chilean Social Protection Survey (EPS). The EPS 
is a longitudinal survey drawn from a nationally representative sample of 
households of age 18 or older that participate in the formal labor sector. The goal of 
this survey is to provide information for the design and evaluation of public policies 
related to the Chilean social protection system. The EPS contains a number of 
variables that are likely to capture the underlying factors related to households’ 
decision to obtain savings and investment instruments. Indeed, the EPS collects 
detailed information about use of formal financial services, demographics, access 
and use of information technologies, financial literacy, attitudes towards financial 
planning and risk attitudes. In this paper, we use data for 14,463 households who 
were interviewed in 2009. In terms of demographics, the average respondent lives 
in a household with monthly income equal to $702, completed 10 years of education 
(equivalent to a high school sophomore) and is 50 years old. 
The dependent variables used in this study are (i) a dummy that takes value 
1 for households with a savings account and (ii) the amount of savings as a fraction 
of household income. The data on savings account holding and the amount of 
savings are obtained from the following questions of the EPS: "Do you or your 
partner have a bank savings account?" Individuals who respond affirmatively to 
this question are also asked: “What is the approximate amount of savings in such 
account(s)?” Nearly 10 percent of the respondents declare having a bank savings 
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account. Conditional on having a savings account, the median household has a 
balance equal to 63% of the household income (or $439) in their savings account.  
Classical models of intertemporal consumption suggest that time preferences 
are a key driver of savings behavior. Patient individuals are more likely to postpone 
present consumption and consequently to find it more useful to have a savings 
account. In our data, we construct a measure for time preferences based on the 
following hypothetical question: "Suppose you knew that if you never save for your 
retirement you would receive a minimum income of US$150 when you retire. Would 
you be willing to save US$20 per month for 20 years before retirement in order to 
increase your monthly income at retirement to US$180?" Individuals who 
responded “yes” were labeled as "Patient". In the survey, 64% of the respondents are 
patient. 
I also consider two variables that attempt to capture the extent to which 
households engage in financial planning. The first variable ("Retirement Planning") 
is obtained from a question first used by Lusardi and Mitchell (2007): "Have you 
ever tried to figure out how much money you need to retire?"  Only 6% of the 
individuals respond affirmatively to this question. For the second variable we 
consider the following survey question: "How often do you keep control of your 
expenses? The alternatives are: (a) Always, (b) most of the time, (c) rarely and (d) 
never." We define "Budget" as a dummy variable that takes value 1 for individuals 
who respond either always or most of the time. We find that 62% of the respondents 
keep control of their expenses either always or most of the time. 
In order to engage in financial contracts, households need to have the basic 
financial knowledge about its terms and potential uses. The EPS contains a special 
section with a seven-question financial literacy quiz that allows measuring the level 
of financial knowledge of households. These questions measure the extent to which 
people are able to make simple calculations regarding probabilities, compound 
interest and also by asking whether they know the concept of inflation and risk 
diversification. The specific wording of the questions is in appendix 1. Using the 
responses to these questions we construct a financial literacy index that is defined 
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as the number of correct answers. The level of financial literacy of the average 
respondent is just 2.2 correct answers out of seven. 
Another variable we control for is risk aversion. The correlation between risk 
aversion and the probability that households have and use a savings account is not 
clear. More risk averse individuals may be more prone to use savings instruments 
for precautionary motives and thus might be more willing to use bank savings 
accounts. In contrast, they might experience greater disutility from being cheated 
by formal institutions and thus be less willing to use formal financial markets. As a 
measure of risk aversion we use the question proposed and validated by Dohmen 
(2011): "On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is "not willing" and 10 "fully willing", 
generally speaking, are you a person willing to take risk?" The answers were 
rescaled such that 0 stands for a risk lover and 10 for a risk averse individual. In 
average, respondents have a risk aversion equal to 5. 
Our dataset also allows controlling for access and use of communication and 
information technologies in the household. Indeed, the EPS contains a question that 
allows to determine the presence of landline phone, cell phone, computer, access to 
internet and cable television in the household. Since access to and use of different 
communication and information technologies are highly correlated with each other, 
I consider the first principal component of these variables as a measure of "Access 
and use of IT" in our estimations. 
In order to control for distance barriers in access to savings accounts we use 
the number of “Branches per-capita” at municipality level. This indicator is a proxy 
for the average number of people served by a branch and can be interpreted as a 
crude measure of the demographic penetration of the banking system in each 
municipality (Beck et al., 2007). The average household lives in a municipality with 
12 branches per 100,000 inhabitants. Further, while there are households without 
branches in their municipality, there are households with a maximum of 140 
branches per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Other variables considered in our dataset attempt to capture economic 
conditions, the quality of legal enforcement, religious beliefs, presence of civic 
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organizations. The definition of these variables is in appendix 1 and its descriptive 
statistics in Table 3.1. 
 
3.5. Results 
 
3.5.1. Civic Capital and Use of Savings Accounts 
 
Panel (a) of Table 3.2 presents linear probability model estimates for the 
effect of CIVIC on the probability that a household has a bank savings account36. 
Significance tests are based on robust standard errors that are clustered at 
municipality level in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity within each 
municipality. The first column shows a positive and significant correlation between 
CIVIC and savings account holding after controlling for a set of basic demographic 
indicators: income, wealth, gender, schooling and age. This correlation is significant 
at the 1-percent level. Individual income, wealth and schooling are significant and 
have the expected sign. Older individuals are more likely to have a savings account 
with a bank and there are no significant differences by gender. 
In the second column, I replicate the previous specification after including 
controls for patience, attitudes towards financial planning, financial literacy and 
risk aversion. The coefficient associated to civic capital does not suffer major 
changes and is significant at the 1-percent level. Further, savings accounts are more 
likely to be held by households were respondents are more patient, plan for 
retirement, prepare a budget for their expenses and have higher levels of financial 
knowledge.  
In column (3), I control for the variable “Access and use of IT” that captures 
the extent to which households use information and communication technologies 
such as landline phone, cell phone, computer, internet and cable television. The 
rationale for including this variable is that lack of information is one potential 
                                                          
36 The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the marginal effects of a Probit model 
estimated at the mean values of the explanatory variables. 
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barrier for access to formal financial services and that our coefficient for civic 
capital can be capturing some of this variation. While use of information 
technologies is positively correlated with the probability that a household has a 
bank savings account, the coefficient of civic capital is positive and significant at the 
1-percent and the magnitude does not suffer major changes compared to the 
previous specification.  
One potential concern with our previous estimations is that civic capital may 
be correlated with other factors at municipality level that can also affect the 
probability that households have a bank account. In order to address this concern, I 
introduce three variables that fit in this description. First, the variable "branches 
per-capita" controls for the role of distance barriers on access to savings accounts 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007; Beck, Demirguc Kunt and 
Honohan, 2008). In areas with low bank penetration individuals are more likely to 
wait longer in order to have access to banking services since there are less branches 
per individual. Similarly, in areas without a bank branch individuals probably need 
to travel farther to open and use a bank account. If areas of higher civic capital have 
greater bank branch penetration, then excluding branch penetration from the 
specification can bias upwards the coefficient associated to civic capital. The 
downside of controlling for bank branch penetration is that civic capital can affect 
the demand for bank accounts through the presence of bank branches. This can in 
turn absorb part of the effect of civic capital on the probability that households have 
savings accounts and can bias downwards the coefficient associated to civic capital. 
Thus, including a control for bank branch penetration, I opt for a conservative 
estimate of the effect of our measure of civic capital on the probability that a 
household has a bank account. Similarly, I consider the level of income at 
municipality level in order to control for the economic conditions in the community 
where the household lives. Households from areas with high level of income are 
more likely to have access to bank branches and infrastructure that ease their 
access to banks. However, if higher income is driven by civic capital, then including 
this measure can absorb part of the variation due to civic capital.  
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In addition, one of the mechanisms through which civic capital can affect the 
probability that a household has a bank account is trust. However, as pointed out by 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), the level of trust in a community can be due to 
the quality of institutions in general and legal enforcement in particular. 
Households in communities with weaker legal enforcement may have a lower level 
of trust and be less likely to rely on formal financial services. In this context, the 
third variable considered is a proxy of legal enforcement: the ratio between the 
number of individuals arrested and the number of crimes reported in a 
municipality. The idea behind this variable is that in areas of better legal 
enforcement one should observe more captures as a fraction of the number of crimes 
reported. In column (4), I replicate the estimations of column (3) after including 
controls for bank branch penetration, municipality income and a measure of legal 
enforcement37. The coefficient associated to civic capital keeps significant at the 1-
percent and its magnitude does not suffer major variation. This is the base 
specification without region fixed effects. 
Finally, since Chile is politically and administratively divided into 15 regions, 
there might be unobserved factors at regional level that affect both the level of civic 
capital and the probability that a household has a bank account. In order to control 
for these institutional factors, I introduce region fixed effects. While these fixed 
effects absorb part of the effect of CIVIC, I prefer to use them and have a more 
conservative estimate of our parameter of interest. The results reported in column 
(5) indicate that the coefficient drops by a fourth but is still positive and significant 
at the 1-percent level. This is the base specification with region fixed effects. 
In panel (b) of Table 3.2, I report the Tobit estimates for the correlation 
between CIVIC and the savings to income ratio after controlling for the same group 
of variables considered in panel (a). The coefficients reported are marginal effects 
evaluated at the mean of the regressors conditional on a positive savings to income 
                                                          
37 As an alternative to the number of branches per capita I considered the number of branches per 
square kilometer and the results do not change. As an alternative for income per-capita I also 
considered schooling and poverty rate at municipality level. These variables are highly correlated 
with income and including them in the regression does not change the results. 
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ratio. Standard errors are robust and clustered at municipality level. The patterns 
of results are similar to those from panel (a). Indeed, columns (1) to (5) of the table 
show a positive and significant correlation at the 1-percent between CIVIC and the 
savings-to-income ratio across different specifications.  
Overall, the results suggest a positive and significant correlation between our 
measure of civic capital with both the probability that the household has a bank 
savings account and the savings to income ratio. In terms of the extensive margin, 
the correlation between our measure of civic capital and the probability that a 
household has a bank savings account ranges between 15 to 22 percent. This 
implies that moving from a municipality in the 10 percentile of civic capital (2.8%) 
to the 90 percentile (17%), increases the probability of savings account holding 
between 2.1 and 3.1 percentage points. In the intensive margin, the correlation 
between CIVIC and the savings to income ratio ranges between 0.57 and 0.81. In 
terms of the economic magnitude, a household that moves from a municipality with 
a level of civic capital in the 10 percentile to a municipality in the 90 percentile is 
associated with an increase in the mean savings to income ratio (1.44) that ranges 
between 5.6 and 8 percentage points for households with positive savings in their 
savings account. 
  
3.5.2. Is Civic Capital a Proxy for Penetration of 
Community Organizations?  
 
One concern with our measure of civic capital is that it can be capturing 
economic or legal incentives associated to the penetration of civic organizations in 
the community. Indeed, the origin and existence of these organizations can be the 
result of an initiative of the local government that does not necessarily respond to 
the strength of social norms in the community. Further, participation in community 
organizations can be partially due to the economic benefits they provide. In order to 
address this concern, I include the incidence of civic organizations with legal 
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personality in the base specification with and without region fixed effects. One 
downside of this test is that the presence of formal civic organizations is also 
affected by the strength of social norms in the municipality. Thus, the coefficient 
associated to the variable that measures the presence of civic organizations can also 
pick up some of the variation in the level of civic capital that is not driven by 
economic and legal incentives. In fact, as one would expect, the correlation between 
my measure of civic capital and the number of civic organizations per capita is 55%. 
Column (1) of table 3.3 reports the effects of the base estimation without including 
region FEs after controlling for the incidence of civic organizations. I find that the 
coefficient associated to the measure of civic capital is significant at the 5-percent 
level and the coefficient is somewhat smaller. The coefficient associated to the 
number of formal civic organizations is positive and significant at the 1-percent 
level. Column (2) replicates the results controlling for region FEs. The coefficient 
associated to our measure of civic capital is still positive and significant at the 5-
percent level. The magnitude is slightly smaller compared to the specification 
without the measure of civic organizations. Surprisingly, the effect of the variable 
that captures the incidence of civic organizations on savings account holding is 
totally absorbed by region FEs. Columns (3) and (4) provide the Tobit estimates for 
the correlation between CIVIC and the savings to income rate after including the 
same set of controls than in columns (1) and (2) respectively. The coefficient 
associated to CIVIC is positive and significant at the 1-percent level. The effect of 
community organizations is positive and significant in the specification without 
region fixed effects but not in the specification that includes region fixed effects. 
Overall, this analysis suggests that the results of the previous section are not 
picking up the effect associated to the presence of civic organizations with legal 
personality across municipalities.  
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3.5.3. Is Civic Capital a Proxy for Religion?  
 
Prior studies argue that religious factors matter for financial decisions and 
asset prices (e.g. Hilary and Wai Hui, 2009; Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2011). Since 
Chile is a former Spanish colony, geographic differences in the measure of civic 
capital as well as the probability that households have a bank savings account can 
be correlated with individuals’ religious beliefs and their participation in religious 
organizations. Indeed, the presence of religious organizations in a community can 
be a source of values and social norms (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011). For 
instance, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) show that individuals who grew up in 
a family that practice any religion have stronger moral values and tend to trust 
more than those who did not. Similarly, individual interaction through religious 
organizations can operate as a source of information about availability and best 
uses of formal financial services. In order to explore if the correlation between 
CIVIC with the probability that a household has a bank account and the level of 
savings is not driven by religious beliefs in the municipality, I replicate the previous 
estimations after controlling for measures of religious beliefs. The variable 
“RELIGION” measures the fraction of households in the municipality that follow 
any religion. The average household lives in a municipality where 63% of the 
population declares to follow any religion and the correlation between RELIGION 
and CIVIC is 25%. The first two columns of table 3.4 present the results for our 
base specification for the probability that a household has a bank savings account 
and the savings to income ratio after controlling for RELIGION. The coefficient for 
CIVIC is positive and significant at the 1-percent level and the magnitude does not 
change compared to the base estimations. In contrast, the coefficient associated to 
RELIGION is not significant at conventional levels of significance. 
In addition, since the catholic religion is more hierarchical than protestant 
religions, there might be differences in the way individuals with different religious 
beliefs participate in the community and thus contribute to the formation of civic 
capital (Putnam, 1993; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2011). Thus, a second test on 
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the role of religion is based on data about the fraction of individuals who have 
specific religious orientations. As shown in table 3.1, the dominant religions are 
Catholic (48%) and evangelic (10%), which taken together represent over 95% of 
religious orientations. In columns (3) and (4) of table 3.4, I estimate the correlation 
of CIVIC with both the probability that a household has a savings account and the 
savings to income ratio after controlling for the fraction of CATHOLIC and 
EVANGELIC population in the municipality. The coefficients associated to CIVIC 
keep significant at the 1-percent level and the magnitudes are similar to those of 
the base estimation. The proxies for religion are not significant at conventional 
levels. Overall, these results suggest that our estimates for CIVIC are not capturing 
the geographic heterogeneity in religious beliefs.  
 
3.5.4. Civic Capital and Age   
 
I argue in section 2 that the political participation of 18-19 years old 
individuals can be interpreted as a result of the strength of social norms and values 
within their communities and households. Consistent with this premise, one would 
expect to observe a stronger association of the measure of civic capital with both the 
probability that a household has a bank savings account and the savings to income 
ratio for younger households in our sample. I explore this idea by replicating the 
previous estimations for the subsamples of households where the respondents are 
below and above the median age respectively. Since the median age of the sample is 
48 years, the subsample of younger individuals is likely to include the generation of 
relatives and other members in the community that are more likely to shape the 
values and beliefs of 18-19 year old individuals. The results in table 3.5 show that 
the coefficient associated to CIVIC is positively and significantly correlated with 
both the probability that a household has a bank savings account and the savings to 
income ratio for households below the median age but not for households above the 
median age. The difference between the coefficient associated to CIVIC for 
households below and above the median age is statistically significant at the 10-
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percent level and these results hold in both specifications with and without region 
fixed effects.  
 
3.6. Cross Sectional Variation 
 
I argue that the effect of civic capital on the probability that households have 
a savings account operates through two main channels: trust and information. In 
this context, one would expect the results documented in the previous section to be 
stronger for households who need to rely more in trust and have less access to 
formal information and communication technologies that enable them to learn 
about the costs and benefits of savings accounts. In this section, I perform a number 
of tests that explore this hypothesis. 
 
3.6.1. Civic Capital, Education, Communication and 
Information Technologies 
 
Following early work on the role of social norms and trust on economic 
outcomes (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Knack and Zack, 1998), I study how 
previous results vary with the level of education. Individuals who do not understand 
the terms of a savings account and the ways in which they can be used should be 
less likely to have a bank account. Thus, since more educated individuals find it 
easier to acquire knowledge about the cost and benefits of having a savings account, 
civic capital should matter more for less educated individuals. I test this idea by 
separately estimating the base regressions for respondents with more and less than 
12 years of schooling, which is the number of years of education required to 
graduate from high school. 
Columns (1) and (2) of table 3.6 show that the correlation of CIVIC and the 
probability that a household has a bank savings account is positive and significant 
at the 1-percent level for households where the respondent does not have studies 
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beyond high school but it is not significant for those with at least some higher 
education. In columns (3) and (4), I provide the Tobit estimates of the correlation 
between CIVIC and the savings to income ratio for individuals with high and low 
levels of education respectively. The coefficient associated to CIVIC is positive and 
significant at the 1-percent for individuals with low education but it is not 
significant for those with a high level of education. While the difference between the 
coefficients of civic capital for individuals with high and low education is not 
significant at conventional levels of significance, the results suggest that the 
correlation between civic capital with the probability that households have a 
savings account and the savings to income ratio are driven by individuals with no 
studies beyond high school. I replicate previous estimations dividing our sample 
between individuals with a level of financial literacy above and below the median of 
two correct responses to the financial literacy quiz. The results, reported in columns 
(5)-(8), do not show major differences between individuals with a level of financial 
literacy above versus below the median38.  
Knowledge about cost and benefits of savings accounts is also easier to be 
acquired in households whose members have communication and information 
technologies (IT). In this context, civic capital should play a greater role among 
households who do not have information and communication devices such as phone 
or internet connection. I explore this idea by dividing the sample between 
individuals with high and low access to IT. Households with high (low) access to and 
use of IT are those for whom the variable “access to and use of IT” is above (below) 
the median. Panel (a) of table 3.7 show in columns (1) and (2) that the correlation 
between CIVIC and the probability that a household has a bank savings account is 
positive and significant at the 1-percent level for households with low access to IT 
while it is not significant for those with high access to IT. This result is mostly 
driven by households without landline phone, internet and computer (columns (3)-
                                                          
38 These results are qualitatively the same when the criterion to label households with high and low 
levels of financial literacy are 3 and 4 correct answers to the financial literacy quiz. This result is not 
reported but available upon request. 
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(8)). Similarly, columns (1) and (2) of panel (b) show a correlation between CIVIC 
and the savings to income ratio is positive and significant at the 1-percent level for 
households with low access to and use IT but not for households with “high” access 
to information technologies. This result is also driven by households without 
landline phone, internet and computer (columns (3)-(8) in panel (b))   
Overall, the positive association between CIVIC with the probability that a 
household has a savings account and the savings to income ratio documented in the 
previous section are mostly driven by households without landline phone, computer 
and connection to the internet. Taken together, these results suggest that civic 
capital helps households to overcome barriers to savings accounts that are related 
to low education and have less communication and information technologies. 
 
3.6.2. Civic Capital and Legal Enforcement 
 
One of the mechanisms through which civic capital can affect the probability 
that households use bank savings accounts is by sustaining higher levels of trust 
within the community. Consistent with this premise, one would expect a stronger 
effect of civic capital in municipalities with weaker legal enforcement. In order to 
study this idea, I divide the sample in households who live in municipalities above 
and below the median of my measure of legal enforcement. The results in table 3.8 
show no major differences for the coefficient associated to CIVIC across 
municipalities with high and low degree of legal enforcement both for the 
probability that a household has a savings account and the amount deposited in 
these accounts.  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
 
This paper studies the role of civic capital for the use of deposit accounts 
among Chilean households. Using an institutional setting of limited supply side 
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barriers for access to deposit accounts and a rich household data set, I find that 
households from areas with higher levels of civic capital, measured as the rate of 
registration to vote, are more likely to have savings accounts and hold larger 
amounts in those accounts. This association is stronger for households that are less 
educated and less intensive users of communication and information devices such as 
phone, computer and connection to the internet. Furthermore, the results are not 
driven by differences in socioeconomic characteristics, behavioral traits (patience 
and risk aversion), penetration in bank branch penetration, legal enforcement, 
religion and geographic penetration of community organizations.  Taken together, 
these results are consistent with the idea that civic capital helps to overcome 
educational and informational barriers that limit the demand for deposit accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
3.8. References 
 
Banfield, Edward C, 1958, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York: 
Free Press. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Maria Peria, 2007, Reaching Out: 
Access to and use of banking services across countries, Journal of 
Financial Economics 85, 234-266. 
Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier, 2000, ―Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural 
Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 115 (3), 955-988. 
Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier, 2001, The Economics of Cultural 
Transmission and the Evolution of Preferences, Journal of Economic 
Theory, v. 97 (1), 298-319. 
Brown, Jeffrey R., Zoran Ivkovic, Paul A. Smith, and Scott Weisbenner, 2008, 
Neighbors matter: Causal community effects and stock market 
participation, Journal of Finance 63, 1509–1531. 
Cassar, Alessandra, Luke Crowley, and Bruce Wydick, 2007, “The Effect of 
Social Capital on Group Loan Repayment: Evidence from Field 
Experiments”, The Economic Journal 117(517), 85–106. 
Cole, Shawn, Thomas Sampson, and Bilal Zia, 2011, Prices or Knowledge? What 
Drives Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets?, Journal of 
Finance, 66(6): 1933-67. 
Coleman, James, 1990, Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990 
Collins, Daryl, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, and Orlanda Ruthven. 
2009. Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Cull, Rober, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Jonathan Morduch, 2013, Banking the 
World: Empirical Foundations of Financial Inclusion, MIT University 
Press. 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Leora Klapper, 2012, Measuring Financial Inclusion: 
The Global Findex Database, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 6025. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jurgen Shurp, Gert 
Wagner, 2005, Individual Risk Attitudes: New Evidence from a Large, 
Representative, Experimentally Validated Survey, German Institute for 
Economic Research Discussion Paper 511. 
107 
 
Duflo, E., and Saez, E., 2003, The Role of Information and Social Interactions in 
Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 815-842. 
CGAP, 2010, Financial Access Initiative 2010: The State of Financial Inclusion 
through the Crisis, Washington, DC: CGAP. 
FDIC, 2012, National Survey of Unbanked and Under-banked Households, 
Washington, DC: FDIC. 
Fisher G. and M. Ghatak, 2011, Spanning the Chasm: Uniting Theory and 
Empirics in Microfinance Research, in B. Armendariz and M. Labie (ed.s), 
Handbook of Microfinance, World Scientific 
Ghatak, Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guinnane, 1999, The Economics of Lending 
with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice, Journal of Development 
Economics, 60, pp.195–228. 
Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999, “Group Lending, Local Information and Peer 
Selection”, Journal of Development Economics, 60, 27–50. 
Giné, X., L. Menand, R. Townsend, and J. Vickery, 2010, “Microinsurance: a case 
study of the Indian rainfall index insurance market”, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 5459, The World Bank. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2004, The role of social capital 
in financial development, American Economic Review 94, 526–556. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2008, Trusting the stock 
market, Journal of Finance 63, 2557–2600. 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2011, Civic Capital as the 
Missing Link, in: Handbook of Social Economics, Edited by Alberto Bisin, 
Jess Benhabib, and Matt Jackson, Elsevier, 417-477 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2003. “People’s Opium? 
Religion and Economic Attitudes.” Journal of Monetary Economics 50: 
225-282. 
Hilary, Gilles, Hui, Kai Wai, 2009. Does religion matter in corporate decision 
making in America? Journal of Financial Economics 93, 455–473. 
Hong, Harrison, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy C. Stein, 2004, Social interaction 
and stock-market participation, Journal of Finance 59, 137–163. 
Hong, Harrison, Jeffrey D. Kubik, and Jeremy C. Stein, 2005, Thy neighbor’s 
portfolio: Wordof-mouth effects in the holdings and trades of money 
managers, Journal of Finance 60, 2801–2824. 
INJUV, 2010, Sexta Encuesta Nacional de la Juventud, Santiago, Chile: INJUV. 
Ivkovic, Zoran and Scott Weisbenner, 2007, Information Diffusion Effects in 
Individual Investors’ Common Stock Purchases: Covet Thy Neighbors’ 
Investment Choices. Review of Financial Studies 20:1327–57. 
108 
 
Karlan, Dean S. 2005, Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital 
and Predict Financial Decisions, American Economic Review, vol. 95(5), 
1688-1699 
Karlan, Dean S., 2007, Social Connections and Group Banking, Economic 
Journal 117(517), F52–F84. 
Kaustia, Markku, Sami Torstila. 2011. Stock market aversion? Political 
preferences and stock market participation. Journal of Financial 
Economics 100(1) 98-112. 
Knack, Stephen and Keefer, Philip, Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff?: A Cross-country Investigation, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1996, 112 (4), 1251. 
Kumar, Alok, Jeremy Page, and Oliver Spalt. 2011. “Religious Beliefs, Gambling 
Attitudes, and Financial Market Outcomes.” Journal of Financial 
Economics 102(3): 671-708. 
Lusardi, Anna Maria and Olivia Mitchell, 2007, Baby Boomer Retirement 
Security: The Roles of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth, 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(1): 205-24. 
Portes, Alejandro, 1998, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern 
Sociology, Annual Review of Sociology 24, 1-24. 
Putnam, Robert, 2000, “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community”. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Putnam, Robert D., 1993), “Making Democracy Work”, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Solow, Robert (1995), Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 
(Book Review), The New Republic, v. 213, 36-40. 
Tabellini, Guido, 2008, The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, v. 3, 905-950. 
World Bank, 2007, Finance for all? Policies and pitfalls in expanding access. 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
3.9. Tables 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard  
Deviation 
Min Max N 
Savings Account 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 14380 
Savings to income ratio 0.11 0.00 0.60 0.00 4.76 13034 
CIVIC 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.47 14463 
Income 0.70 0.40 1.67 0.00 32.89 14463 
Wealth 0.37 0.20 0.95 -0.90 20.20 12383 
Years of Schooling 9.55 10.00 4.31 0.00 20.00 14334 
Male=1 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 14463 
Age 49.90 48.00 15.23 19.00 108.00 14463 
Risk aversion 4.91 5.00 3.25 0.00 10.00 13889 
Patience 0.64 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 14463 
Plan for retirement =1  0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 14463 
Budget=1 0.62 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 14463 
Financial Literacy Index 2.22 2.00 1.89 0.00 7.00 14463 
Access to and use of IT 0.00 -0.45 1.57 -1.97 2.64 14413 
Landline phone=1 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 14446 
Cell phone=1 0.83 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 14425 
Computer=1 0.42 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 14445 
Internet=1 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 14449 
Cable TV=1 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 14450 
Bank branches percapita 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.00 1.39 14463 
Income Municip. 1.11 1.05 0.42 0.42 6.20 14463 
Legal Enforcement 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.03 0.61 14463 
RELIGION 0.63 0.63 0.10 0.30 0.87 14463 
CATHOLIC 0.48 0.48 0.10 0.17 0.77 14463 
EVANGELIC 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.43 14463 
Community Organizations 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 14463 
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Table 3.2, Panel (a): Effect of Civic Capital on Savings Account Holding 
 
The dependent variable, Savings Account, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for households 
who declare having a bank savings account and 0 otherwise. For a description of all the other 
variables see Appendix 1. In all columns, the coefficients correspond to linear probability model 
estimates. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality 
level. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-
percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
CIVIC 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.218*** 0.212*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.066) (0.055) 
Income 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wealth 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Schooling 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male=1 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age squared 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Risk Aversion 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Patience 
 
0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.014*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Plan for retirement=1 
 
0.059*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
  
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Budget=1 
 
0.014*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.015*** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Financial Literacy 
 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Access and use of IT 
  
0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank branches per capita 
   
0.003 0.010 
    
(0.019) (0.016) 
Income Municip. ($1,000) 
   
-0.004 -0.004 
    
(0.008) (0.009) 
Legal Enforcement  
   
-0.003 -0.030 
    
(0.040) (0.035) 
Region FEs No No No No Yes 
Observations 12,232 11,747 11,711 11,711 11,711 
R-squared 0.016 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.032 
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Table 3.2, Panel (b): Effect of Civic Capital on Savings to Income ratio 
 
The dependent variable, Savings to Income, is the amount of savings deposited in the savings 
account divided by the household monthly income. For a description of all the other variables see 
Appendix 1. In all columns, the coefficients are Tobit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in 
the corresponding regressors evaluated at their mean value on the savings to income ratio, 
conditional on a positive savings to income ratio. The standard errors reported in parentheses are 
robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
CIVIC 0.653*** 0.680*** 0.810*** 0.794*** 0.566*** 
 
(0.205) (0.207) (0.206) (0.214) (0.174) 
Income 0.009** 0.007* 0.004 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Wealth 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Schooling 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.007** 0.007** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male=1 -0.003 -0.012 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
Age -0.002 -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.006* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age squared 0.002 0.006* 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Risk Aversion 
 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Patience 
 
0.042* 0.038* 0.038* 0.043** 
  
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Plan for retirement=1 
 
0.142*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.136*** 
  
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
Budget=1 
 
0.060*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 
  
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Financial Literacy 
 
0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Access and use of IT 
  
0.044*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 
   
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Bank branches per capita 
   
0.002 0.021 
    
(0.051) (0.039) 
Income Municip. 
   
-0.017 -0.015 
    
(0.024) (0.028) 
Legal Enforcement 
   
0.014 -0.063 
    
(0.150) (0.136) 
      Observations 11,430 10,972 10,938 10,938 10,938 
Municipalities 237 232 232 232 232 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0170 0.0239 0.0287 0.0288 0.0349 
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Table 3.3: Effect of Civic Capital after controlling for the penetration of 
Community Organizations 
 
Savings Account is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (1) and (2). Savings to 
Income is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include 
the following regressors: branches per capita, Income Munic., Legal Enforcement, Male and risk 
aversion. For a description of all variables see Appendix 1. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
correspond to linear probability model estimates. In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients are Tobit 
estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressors evaluated at their mean 
value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive savings to income ratio. The standard 
errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Savings = 1 
 
Savings to Income ratio 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
    
 
    
CIVIC 0.139** 0.135** 
 
0.573*** 0.546*** 
 
(0.061) (0.055) 
 
(0.203) (0.178) 
Community Organizations 1.904*** 0.480 
 
5.711*** 0.753 
 
(0.638) (0.682) 
 
(2.030) (2.423) 
Income 0.005** 0.005** 
 
0.004 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Wealth 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
0.022*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
Schooling 0.002** 0.002** 
 
0.007** 0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
-0.007* -0.006* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Age squared 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
0.007** 0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Patience 0.012** 0.014*** 
 
0.039* 0.043** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 
0.136*** 0.136*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) 
 
(0.040) (0.039) 
Budget=1 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 
0.060*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
Financial Literacy 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
0.019*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
Access and use of IT 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
0.045*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
      Region Fixed Effects No Yes 
 
No Yes 
Observations 11,711 11,711 
 
10,913 10,913 
Municipalities 234 234 
 
232 232 
R-squared or Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.032   0.0297 0.0350 
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Table 3.4: Effect of Civic Capital after controlling for Religious Beliefs 
 
Savings Account is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (1) and (2). Savings to 
Income is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include 
the following regressors: branches per capita, Income Munic., Legal Enforcement, Male and risk 
aversion. For a description of all variables see Appendix 1. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
correspond to linear probability model estimates. In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients are Tobit 
estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressors evaluated at their mean 
value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive savings to income ratio. The standard 
errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Savings 
Account 
Savings to 
Income ratio  
Savings 
Account 
Savings to 
Income ratio 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
            
CIVIC 0.155*** 0.579*** 
 
0.149*** 0.574*** 
 
(0.054) (0.172) 
 
(0.053) (0.171) 
RELIGION -0.018 -0.038 
   
 
(0.034) (0.120) 
   CATHOLIC 
   
-0.009 -0.025 
    
(0.037) (0.131) 
EVANGELIC 
   
-0.074 -0.064 
    
(0.053) (0.190) 
Income 0.005** 0.004 
 
0.005** 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.004) 
Wealth 0.008*** 0.021*** 
 
0.008*** 0.021*** 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
Schooling 0.002** 0.007** 
 
0.002** 0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
Age -0.003*** -0.006* 
 
-0.003*** -0.006* 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
Age squared 0.003*** 0.007** 
 
0.003*** 0.007** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
 
(0.001) (0.003) 
Patience 0.014*** 0.043** 
 
0.014*** 0.043** 
 
(0.005) (0.022) 
 
(0.005) (0.022) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.057*** 0.135*** 
 
0.057*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.014) (0.039) 
 
(0.014) (0.039) 
Budget=1 0.015*** 0.063*** 
 
0.015*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.006) (0.021) 
 
(0.006) (0.021) 
Financial Literacy 0.006*** 0.019*** 
 
0.006*** 0.019*** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) 
 
(0.002) (0.006) 
Access and use of IT 0.013*** 0.046*** 
 
0.013*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.002) (0.007) 
 
(0.002) (0.007) 
      
Observations 11,711 10,938 
 
11,711 10,938 
Municipalities 234 232 
 
234 232 
R-squared or Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.0296   0.032 0.0296 
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Table 3.5: Effect of Civic Capital and Age 
 
Savings Account is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (1) and (2). Savings to 
Income is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include 
the following regressors: branches per capita, Income Munic., Legal Enforcement, Male and region 
fixed effects. For a description of all variables see Appendix 1. In columns (1) and (2), the coefficients 
are Tobit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressors evaluated at 
their mean value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive savings to income ratio. 
The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * 
indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
 
Savings Account 
 
Savings to Income  
 
Age>48 Age<49 
 
Age>48 Age<49 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
CIVIC 0.066 0.247*** 
 
0.314 0.772*** 
 
(0.056) (0.094) 
 
(0.244) (0.192) 
Income 0.004 0.006* 
 
-0.000 0.005 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.008) (0.005) 
Wealth 0.013*** 0.003 
 
0.033*** 0.012 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.008) (0.009) 
Schooling 0.002* 0.002 
 
0.005 0.010** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Age 0.006** 0.000 
 
0.030** 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.005) 
 
(0.014) (0.015) 
Age squared -0.004* -0.002 
 
-0.019* -0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.007) 
 
(0.010) (0.020) 
Patience 0.016** 0.013* 
 
0.054 0.041 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.038) (0.026) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.055*** 0.059*** 
 
0.164** 0.102** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.066) (0.046) 
Budget=1 0.008 0.022** 
 
0.048 0.069*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.035) (0.025) 
Financial Literacy 0.007*** 0.004 
 
0.035*** 0.008 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.011) (0.007) 
Access and use of IT 0.010*** 0.016*** 
 
0.047*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.013) (0.008) 
      Observations 5,691 6,020 
 
5,350 5,588 
Municipalities 193 203 
 
192 200 
R-squared or Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.037   0.0361 0.0403 
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Table 3.6: Civic Capital, Education and Financial Literacy 
 
Savings Account is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). Savings to Income is the dependent variable 
for the regressions in columns (3), (4), (5) and (6). All regressions include the following regressors: branches per capita, Income Munic., 
Legal Enforcement, Male and region fixed effects. For a description of all variables see Appendix 1. In columns (1), (2), (5) and (6), the 
coefficients correspond to linear probability model estimates. In columns (3), (4), (7) and (8), the coefficients are Tobit estimates of the effect 
of a marginal change in the corresponding regressors evaluated at their mean value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive 
savings to income ratio. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that 
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Savings 
 
Savings to Income 
 
Savings 
 
Savings to Income 
 
At least 
some college 
High school 
graduation 
or less 
 
At least 
some college 
High school 
graduation 
or less 
 
High 
Financial 
Literacy 
Low 
Financial 
Literacy 
 
High 
Financial 
Literacy 
Low 
Financial 
Literacy 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
                        
CIVIC 0.065 0.168*** 
 
0.362 0.628*** 
 
0.125* 0.154*** 
 
0.499*** 0.606*** 
 
(0.180) (0.058) 
 
(0.391) (0.178) 
 
(0.067) (0.057) 
 
(0.184) (0.230) 
Income 0.002 0.006* 
 
-0.000 0.007 
 
0.006** 0.004 
 
0.003 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
 
(0.007) (0.005) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Wealth 0.010 0.007** 
 
0.017** 0.028*** 
 
0.009** 0.004 
 
0.023*** 0.016 
 
(0.006) (0.003) 
 
(0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
Schooling 0.003 0.000 
 
0.014 0.001 
 
0.003** 0.001 
 
0.009** 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.001) 
 
(0.010) (0.004) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Age -0.004 -0.003** 
 
-0.003 -0.007* 
 
-0.004** -0.003** 
 
-0.007 -0.011* 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Age squared 0.003 0.002** 
 
0.004 0.007* 
 
0.004** 0.003** 
 
0.008 0.009* 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
 
(0.008) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Patience 0.021 0.014** 
 
0.022 0.053** 
 
0.017** 0.010 
 
0.043* 0.039 
 
(0.015) (0.005) 
 
(0.036) (0.025) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.025) (0.035) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.083** 0.048*** 
 
0.093 0.158*** 
 
0.057*** 0.055** 
 
0.113*** 0.196** 
 
(0.032) (0.015) 
 
(0.059) (0.050) 
 
(0.016) (0.024) 
 
(0.041) (0.079) 
Budget=1 0.037** 0.012** 
 
0.096** 0.053** 
 
0.020** 0.010 
 
0.073*** 0.047 
 
(0.018) (0.005) 
 
(0.046) (0.024) 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.026) (0.033) 
Financial Literacy 0.003 0.006*** 
 
0.003 0.023*** 
 
0.005* -0.002 
 
0.016* -0.011 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
 
(0.010) (0.007) 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.032) 
Access and use of IT 0.014*** 0.012*** 
 
0.031** 0.050*** 
 
0.013*** 0.013*** 
 
0.042*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.005) (0.002) 
 
(0.013) (0.008) 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.009) (0.011) 
            Observations 1,994 9,717 
 
1,886 9,052 
 
6,819 4,892 
 
6,422 4,516 
Municipalities 142 225 
 
141 222 
 
206 192 
 
203 191 
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.024   0.0226 0.0317   0.032 0.022   0.0307 0.0330 
116 
 
Table 3.7, Panel (a): Civic Capital and use of Communication and Information Technologies 
 
The dependent variable, Savings Account, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for households who declare having a bank savings 
account and 0 otherwise. For a description of all the other variables see Appendix 1. In all columns, the coefficients correspond to linear 
probability model estimates. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate 
that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
High access 
and use of IT 
Low access 
and use of IT  
Phone 
No 
Phone  
Internet 
No 
Internet  
Computer 
No 
Computer 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
                        
CIVIC 0.116 0.191*** 
 
0.069 0.201*** 
 
0.104 0.185*** 
 
0.135 0.186*** 
 
(0.106) (0.061) 
 
(0.087) (0.060) 
 
(0.173) (0.063) 
 
(0.109) (0.062) 
Income 0.006* 0.003 
 
0.008** -0.001 
 
0.002 0.008** 
 
0.002 0.015** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.002) (0.006) 
Wealth 0.008** 0.008** 
 
0.009*** 0.005 
 
0.012** 0.005 
 
0.009** 0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.003) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Schooling 0.003 0.001 
 
0.003** 0.001 
 
0.004* 0.001 
 
0.003** 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Age -0.005** -0.002* 
 
-0.005*** -0.002 
 
-0.008*** -0.002 
 
-0.005** -0.002** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Age squared 0.005** 0.002* 
 
0.004*** 0.001 
 
0.007*** 0.002 
 
0.005** 0.002** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
Patience 0.024*** 0.008 
 
0.022*** 0.006 
 
0.032*** 0.009* 
 
0.026*** 0.007 
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.011) (0.005) 
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.061*** 0.052*** 
 
0.069*** 0.041** 
 
0.075** 0.047*** 
 
0.055** 0.060*** 
 
(0.023) (0.016) 
 
(0.022) (0.019) 
 
(0.032) (0.016) 
 
(0.023) (0.018) 
Financial Literacy 0.005 0.006*** 
 
0.004 0.007*** 
 
0.006 0.005*** 
 
0.005 0.006*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Budget=1 0.027** 0.008 
 
0.024*** 0.007 
 
0.031** 0.010* 
 
0.023** 0.011* 
 
(0.011) (0.005) 
 
(0.008) (0.006) 
 
(0.015) (0.005) 
 
(0.011) (0.006) 
Access and use of IT 0.012** 0.022*** 
 
0.011*** 0.022*** 
 
0.013 0.018*** 
 
0.011*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.013) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
            Observations 4,333 7,378 
 
5,642 6,069 
 
2,908 8,803 
 
4,674 7,037 
Municipalities 163 222 
 
156 220 
 
143 227 
 
180 214 
R-squared 0.028 0.023   0.035 0.033   0.038 0.023   0.026 0.026 
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Table 3.7 Panel (b): Civic Capital and use of Communication and Information Technologies 
 
The dependent variable, Savings to Income, is the amount of savings in the savings account divided by the household monthly income. For a 
description of all the other variables see Appendix 1. In all columns, the coefficients are Tobit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in 
the corresponding regressors evaluated at their mean value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive savings to income ratio. 
The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is 
statistically different from zero at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
High access 
and use of IT 
Low access and 
use of IT  
Phone 
No 
Phone  
Internet 
No 
Internet  
Computer 
No 
Computer 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
                       
CIVIC 0.451 0.746*** 
 
0.275 0.715*** 
 
0.460 0.683*** 
 
0.482 0.744*** 
 
(0.294) (0.194) 
 
(0.277) (0.162) 
 
(0.400) (0.197) 
 
(0.305) (0.206) 
Income 0.006 0.000 
 
0.009** -0.016 
 
0.000 0.008 
 
-0.001 0.017*** 
 
(0.004) (0.008) 
 
(0.004) (0.010) 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Wealth 0.018*** 0.033*** 
 
0.020*** 0.024* 
 
0.022*** 0.025*** 
 
0.019*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.006) (0.012) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
 
(0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.007) (0.012) 
Schooling 0.009* 0.006 
 
0.009** 0.005 
 
0.013** 0.005 
 
0.012** 0.003 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
Age -0.009 -0.005 
 
-0.009** -0.001 
 
-0.015** -0.002 
 
-0.008 -0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Age squared 0.010 0.005 
 
0.010** 0.001 
 
0.015** 0.003 
 
0.008 0.007 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
 
(0.007) (0.004) 
 
(0.006) (0.004) 
Patience 0.054* 0.033 
 
0.062** 0.022 
 
0.075** 0.031 
 
0.067** 0.019 
 
(0.030) (0.028) 
 
(0.029) (0.029) 
 
(0.037) (0.025) 
 
(0.030) (0.029) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.100* 0.188*** 
 
0.145** 0.126** 
 
0.133* 0.146*** 
 
0.095* 0.205*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) 
 
(0.057) (0.059) 
 
(0.075) (0.050) 
 
(0.055) (0.057) 
Budget=1 0.081** 0.049* 
 
0.072** 0.048* 
 
0.087** 0.053** 
 
0.063** 0.059** 
 
(0.033) (0.026) 
 
(0.029) (0.026) 
 
(0.042) (0.024) 
 
(0.032) (0.028) 
Financial Literacy 0.016 0.023*** 
 
0.016** 0.021*** 
 
0.015 0.020*** 
 
0.013 0.025*** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) 
 
(0.008) (0.007) 
 
(0.012) (0.007) 
 
(0.009) (0.009) 
Access and use of IT 0.037** 0.105*** 
 
0.039*** 0.076*** 
 
0.040 0.073*** 
 
0.030** 0.072*** 
 
(0.018) (0.025) 
 
(0.010) (0.013) 
 
(0.037) (0.015) 
 
(0.013) (0.021) 
            Observations 4,047 6,891 
 
5,270 5,668 
 
2,724 8,214 
 
4,361 6,577 
Municipalities 161 220 
 
155 218 
 
141 225 
 
178 212 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0211 0.0339   0.0313 0.0427   0.0282 0.0297   0.0220 0.0353 
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Table 3.8: Civic Capital and Legal Enforcement 
 
Savings Account is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (1) and (2). Savings to 
Income is the dependent variable for the regressions in columns (3) and (4). All regressions include 
the following regressors: branches per capita, Income Munic., Legal Enforcement, Risk Aversion, 
Male and region fixed effects. For a description of all variables see Appendix 1. In columns (1) and 
(2), the coefficients are Tobit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding 
regressors evaluated at their mean value on the savings to income ratio, conditional on a positive 
savings to income ratio. The standard errors reported in parentheses are robust and clustered at 
municipality level. ***, **, * indicate that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1-, 
5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Savings Account 
 
Savings to Income ratio 
 
High Legal 
Enforcement 
Low Legal 
Enforcement 
 
High Legal 
Enforcement 
Low Legal 
Enforcement 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
            
CIVIC 0.179* 0.136** 
 
0.601* 0.616*** 
 
(0.097) (0.059) 
 
(0.334) (0.169) 
Income 0.006 0.004 
 
0.004 0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Wealth 0.009** 0.006 
 
0.018** 0.022** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
 
(0.008) (0.010) 
Schooling 0.003*** 0.001 
 
0.013*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Age -0.004*** -0.002 
 
-0.010** -0.003 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Age squared 0.004*** 0.002 
 
0.012*** 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Patience 0.017** 0.009 
 
0.054* 0.027 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.032) (0.030) 
Plan for retirement=1 0.043** 0.072*** 
 
0.094 0.173*** 
 
(0.021) (0.018) 
 
(0.060) (0.047) 
Budget=1 0.019*** 0.012 
 
0.072*** 0.053* 
 
(0.007) (0.009) 
 
(0.027) (0.032) 
Financial Literacy 0.004* 0.006** 
 
0.018** 0.018** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) 
Access and use of IT 0.010*** 0.017*** 
 
0.036*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
      Observations 5,782 5,929 
 
5,369 5,569 
Municipalities 58 176 
 
57 175 
R-squared or Pseudo 
R-squared 0.034 0.037   0.040 0.040 
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Appendix 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Description Source 
Savings Account Takes value 1 if the respondent declares 
that either he/she or her/his partner have a 
savings account with a bank. 
EPS (2009) 
Savings to 
Income 
Amount deposited in the savings account 
divided by household income. This variable 
is winsorized at the 1%. 
EPS (2009) 
CIVIC This measure is the fraction of 18 and 19 
year individuals who are registered to vote 
in a given municipality. 
Electoral data is from the 
Chilean Electoral Service 
(SERVEL). Population 
data is from the National 
Bureau of Statistics 
(INE).  
Income  Household income. In US$ 1,000 as of 
December 2009. 
EPS (2009) 
Wealth  Household wealth. In US$ 100,000 as of 
December 2009. 
EPS (2009) 
Schooling Years of schooling. EPS (2009) 
Male=1 Takes value 1 if the respondent is male. EPS (2009) 
Age Age of the respondent. EPS (2009) 
Risk aversion Self-reported measure of risk aversion. This 
measure was computed based on the 
answers to the question "On a scale from 0 
to 10, where 0 is "not willing" and 10 "fully 
willing", generally speaking, are you a 
person willing to take risk?" The answers 
were rescaled such that 0 stands for a risk 
lover and 10 for risk averse individuals.  
EPS (2009) 
Patience Takes value equal to 1 for individuals that 
reply "Yes" to the following hypothetical 
question: "Suppose you knew that if you 
never save for retirement you would receive 
a minimum income of US$150 when you 
retire. Would you be willing to save US$20 
monthly for the last 20 years before 
retirement in order to increase your income 
at retirement to US$180?" 
EPS (2009) 
 
 
 
120 
 
Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Source 
Plan for 
retirement =1  
Takes value equal to 1 for individuals who reply 
"Yes" to the following hypothetical question: 
"Have you ever tried to figure out how much 
money you need to retire?" 
EPS (2009) 
Budget for 
expenditures=1 
Takes value 1 for individuals who respond either 
"always" or "most of the time" to the following 
hypothetical question: "How often do you keep 
control of your expenses? (a) Always, (b) most of 
the time, (c) rarely, (d) never". 
EPS (2009) 
Financial Literacy Number of correct answers in a financial literacy 
quiz that asks the following seven questions. (1) 
"If the chance of catching an illness is 10%, how 
many people out of 1000 would get the illness?" 
(2) "If 5 people share winning lottery tickets and 
the total prize is 2 Million pesos, how much 
would each receive?" (3) "Assume that you have 
$100 in a savings account and the interest rate 
you earn on this money is 2% a year. If you keep 
this money in the account for 5 years, how much 
would you have after 5 years? Alternatives: (a) 
over $120 (b) exactly $120 (c) less than $120." (4) 
"Assume that you have $200 in a savings 
account, and the interest rate that you earn on 
these savings is 10% a year. How much would 
you have in the account after 2 years?" (5) "If the 
PFA (Pension Fund Administrator) "A" obtained 
a return equal to 15% and the PFA "B" obtained 
a return equal to 20% last year. Which PFA will 
have a higher return next year? Alternatives (a) 
PFA "A", (b) PFA "B", (c ) both PFAs will obtain 
the same return and (d) past returns do not 
predict future returns" (6)  "Assume that you 
have $100 in a savings account and the interest 
rate that you earn on these savings is 1% per 
year. Inflation is 2% per year. After one year, if 
you withdraw the money from the savings 
account you could buy more/less/the same?" (7) 
"True or False? Buying shares in one company is 
less risky than buying shares from many 
different companies with the same money" 
EPS (2009) 
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Variable Definitions (Continued) 
 
Variable Description Source 
Access to IT First principal component of five dummies 
that take value 1 if for household who 
declare having a landline phone, cell phone, 
computer, access to internet and cable 
television respectively. 
EPS (2009) 
Bank branches per-
capita 
Number of commercial bank branches per-
capita in the municipality. 
The number of 
commercial bank 
branches is from the 
Chilean Bureau of 
Banks and Financial 
Institutions (SBIF) and 
population at 
municipality level is 
from the Chilean 
Bureau of National 
Statistics (INE) 
Income Municip.  Income level at municipality level in 
$1,000. 
National survey of 
economic 
characterization 
(CASEN). 
Schooling (Municip) Average years of schooling at municipality 
level. 
 
Legal Enforcement 
(People 
arrested/Crimes) 
Number of people arrested over the number 
of crimes in the municipality. 
Chilean Ministry of 
Internal Affairs 
RELIGION Percentage of the population in the 
municipality that declared having any 
religion or creed in the Chilean census in 
2002.  
Chilean Census of the 
Population (2002) 
CATHOLIC Percentage of the population in the 
municipality that declared to be catholic in 
the Chilean census of 2002.  
Chilean Census of the 
Population (2002) 
EVANGELIC Percentage of the population in the 
municipality that declared to be evangelic 
in the Chilean census of 2002.  
Chilean Census of the 
Population (2002) 
Community 
organizations 
Number of community organizations with 
legal personality divided by the population 
in the municipality. Such community 
organizations include: sport clubs, mothers' 
centers, neighborhood councils, 
organizations of seniors and municipality 
unions. 
Municipality survey 
administered by the 
National system of 
municipal information 
(SINIM). 
 
